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Book Review
Voice, Not Choice
Politics, Markets, and America's Schools. By John E. Chubb* and Terry M.
Moe.** Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1990. Pp.xvii, 311. $28.95
(cloth), $10.95 (paper).
James S. Liebmant
You can actively flee, then, and you can actively stay put.'
In John Chubb and Terry Moe's book,' choice is hot; voice is not.3 As
influential as their book has become in current policy debates,4 however, its
* Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution.
** Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.
f Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Bob Crain, Sam Gross, Susan Lusi, James
Meier, Richard Murnane, Harriet Rabb, Chuck Sabel, Janet Sabel, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, and
participants in the Columbia Faculty Workshop provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. This Review
is part of a larger work being published by Oxford University Press, tentatively entitled POLITICAL
DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM (forthcoming 1992).
1. ERIK H. ERIKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY 86 (1964).
2. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, PoLmCs, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990)
[hereinafter by page only].
3. By "choice" I mean reliance on consumers' purchase or rejection of services to determine the
services' future traits and distribution. By "voice" I mean reliance on constituents' expressions about the
value of particular services to make the same determination. "Choice" typically uses market mechanisms
to coordinate individual actions. See infra notes 163-72 and accompanying text. "Voice" often uses
democratic procedures to shape collective action. See infra notes 255-68 and accompanying text.
4. The extensive press coverage given to the book includes Susan Chira, The Rules of the Marketplace
Are Applied to the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1991, at Al (crediting Chubb and Moe with having
"ignited the choice debate"); John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, The Private vs. Public School Debate, WALL
ST. J., July 26, 1991, at A8; John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Reform Can't Be Left to the Education
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data and reasoning may support policies the reverse of those that the authors
and their "New Paradigm" disciples propose.5 In this review, voice is hot;
choice is not.
Chubb and Moe conclude that dropping SAT scores and American students'
poor performance on internationally standardized math and science exams
demonstrate that America's public schools are in crisis.6 Based on an empirical
study of a large sample of students attending American public and private high
schools in the early 1980's,7 the authors give the following account of the
causes of educational failure and success: The "inputs" on which educational
policy debates typically have focused-per capita spending, class size, teacher
experience, and the like-have almost no effect on educational quality (mea-
sured by achievement test scores) at the high school level.8 Putting aside
student ability and family resources, which exert the largest impact on perform-
ance but are more or less immutable,9 the only policy-sensitive input that is
associated with strong academic performance is a school's "effective organiza-
tion"--its "clear goals, . . . ambitious academic program, strong educational
leadership, and high levels of teacher professionalism." 10 Schools permitting
a lot of professional "autonomy," that is, ones with minimal "bureaucratic
influence," are more likely to be effectively organized than schools that do not
Establishment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, at E19; Peter M. Flanigan, A School System That Works, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 12, 1991, at All; Sam Ginn, Education Consumers Should Have a Choice; Still Far to Go,
N.Y. TwIEs, July 17, 1990, at A20; Nicholas Lemann, A False Panacea, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1991, at 101;
Barbara Reynolds, School Choice: All Kids Deserve a Good Education, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 1990, at 11A;
Schoolyard Perestroika, ECONOMIST, June 16, 1990, at 23; Walter Shapiro, Pick a School, Any School, TIME,
Sept. 3, 1990, at 70; Thomas A. Stewart et al., The Most Fascinating Ideasfor 1991, FORTUNE, Jan. 14,
1991, at 30; Abigail Thernstrom, Is Choice a Necessity?, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1990, at 124 (crediting Chubb
and Moe with having led "startling comeback" of long "taboo" subject of educational vouchers); James
Q. Wilson, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools by John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 8, 1990, at 39.
5. Turning the nation to choice is the principal objective of a group of "positive" conservatives in the
Bush Administration marching under the banner of "the New Paradigm." Maureen Dowd, Fate of Domestic
Police Lies in a Battle of Aides, N.Y. TiMs, Nov. 24, 1990, at A8; see Jason DeParle, Bush Blurs Home
Goals, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 3, 1991, at A29. The group gained ground recently when President Bush, his
Council of Economic Advisors, and his new Secretary of Education endorsed educational choice proposals,
including a $230 million "'bribe"' to induce districts and states to pay the tuition of public school students
switching to private schools. Mark Pitsch, Bush Seeks to Reward District Plans that Include Private-School
Choice, EDUC. WK., Feb. 13, 1991, at 1, 29; see Susan Chira, Bush School Plan Would Encourage Choice
by Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at Al; Karen De Witt, New Education Chief Stresses Commitment,
N.Y. TIME, Mar. 19, 1991, at A21; Morning Edition 7-8 (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 14, 1991)
(transcript on file with author).
6. Pp. ix, 1, 6-8. See John E. Chubb & Eric A. Hanushek, Reforming Educational Reform, in SETTING
NATIONAL PRIORITIES: POLICY FOR THE NINETIES 213, 213-17 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1990).
7. Pp. 72-75, 230-31.
8. Pp. 87-88, 101, 105-06 tbl. 4-2, 143-44.
9. Pp. 101, 105-11 & tbls. 4-3 to 4-6, 145-46, 160-65 & tbls. 5-7 to 5-8, 169-70 & tbl. 5-9, 172 &
tbl. 5-10, 294-95 nn.l-3.
10. P. 23.
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permit such autonomy.1 Private and parochial schools exhibit a lot of autono-
my; public schools do not.12
Translating correlation into cause, the authors restate their thesis in reverse:
Private schools give teachers and principals a lot of autonomy, which in turn
facilitates good school organization, which in turn causes high achievement.
Conversely, bureaucratically administered public schools discourage autonomy,
which leads to poor organization, and low achievement. 3
The authors conclude that politicians can solve the crisis in education by
causing all schools to emulate private schools-that is, by substituting "market"
control for "democratic" (by which the authors mean "interest group" and
"bureaucratic") control of the schools." Because market-driven excellence
would come at too high a cost if it entirely sacrificed a public system's welfare
and equity features, the authors would locate a set of new or overhauled schools
in the public sector, subject to loose public regulation.' 5 Within the public
sector, the authors would replace existing systems of funding and student
assignment with a system in which:
" The state (alone) provides funds for participating schools by giving
them "scholarships," in amounts fixed by law, for each child who
enrolls in each school.
" Parental and school choice determines the assignment of children to
schools: Parents may apply to any school in the state, and schools may
select applicants and retain or expel matriculated students on the basis
of any criteria the schools choose, exclusive of race but not, for exam-
ple, of intelligence, achievement, motivation, disciplinary record, and,
possibly, religion.'6
In Part I, I argue that Chubb and Moe exaggerate the impact of school
structure on student achievement. They do so by underestimating the impact
of parent and student educational "tastes," mislabeling evidence of personal
tastes as elements of school structure, and treating mundane structural effects
of good or bad achievement as important policy-driven causes of that achieve-
ment. As a result, the authors fail to rule out a plausible alternative explanation
of their data: that the educationally oriented parents and children (call them
"educational connoisseurs"' 7) who congregate in private schools demand and
receive higher quality educational services than do consumers with less exacting
educational tastes.
11. Pp. 147-55.
12. Pp. 175-83.
13. Pp. 23-24, 37, 48-51, 56-57, 141, 174, 180-81.
14. Pp. 2, 17, 29-33, 167, 180-81, 206-15; see infra note 265.
15. Pp. 206, 217-19, 225.
16. Pp. 219-23. The authors' "preference would be to include religious schools .... as long as their
sectarian functions can be kept clearly separate from their educational functions." P. 219.
17. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCH1MAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 49 (1970).
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Part II concludes that enhancement of choice along the lines the authors
propose would put even more children at educational risk than the existing
system and thus would make an educationally (and equitably) bad situation
worse.
Drawing on theories that Albert 0. Hirschman developed twenty years
ago, 8 Part III explains how an excess of the market mechanism of "choice"
caused the crisis in public education and how enhancement of the democratic
mechanism of "voice"--the conceptual opposite of choice-might make public
schools better. Rejecting the authors' curious elision of "bureaucracy" and
"democracy," and their juxtaposition of both to markets, Part III argues that
bureaucracy actually stands between markets and democracy as a third form
of organizational control, and that bureaucracy only came to dominate urban
public schools in response to increasing parental exit from, and declining
parental voice in the administration of, those schools. Accepting the authors'
critique of bureaucratic control, and doubting the wisdom of market control,
Part III sketches a proposal for enhanced parental voice in, and democratic
control of, the public schools.
I. WHY CAN'T JANE AND JOHNNY READ?
A. The Authors' Statistical Story Stated
Chubb and Moe ask a question that has occupied researchers for years:
Why do some children learn more in school than others? The authors' answer
is new and sophisticated: Market forces favor school autonomy; school autono-
my fosters effective organization; effective organization promotes achieve-
ment.' 9 Or, even more simply, market forces promote achievement." This
section describes each step in the authors' argument in order to begin examin-
ing whether the argument's sophistication illuminates or obscures.2
18. Id.
19. See p. 37 ("In a market setting .... there are strong forces at work-arising from the technical,
administrative, and consumer-satisfaction requirements of organizational success-that promote school
autonomy."); p. 23 ("[T]he most important prerequisite for the emergence of effective school characteristics
is school autonomy, especially from external bureaucratic influence .... ); p. 174 ("School organization
is crucial for achievement above and beyond the influence of students and parents. Autonomy from
bureaucracy is crucial for school organization above and beyond the kinds of students and parents being
served by the organization."); pp. 125-33 & tbls. 4-8 to 4-10, 160-62 & tbls. 5-7 to 5-8, 176 tbl. 5-11.
20. Pp. 141, 180-81.
21. "Chubb and Moe claim uniqueness for their argument[] about reform... [because] their argument
grows out of the quantitative analysis of empirical data." Gene V. Glass & Dewayne A. Matthews, Are Data
Enough?, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Apr. 1991, at 24, 25. Deciding whether Chubb and Moe in fact provide "the
research legitimation that the school choice movement has been waiting for" or, instead, "a polemic wrapped
in numbers" is accordingly central to the task of evaluating their work. Id. at 26.
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Step 1: Researchers have long known that parental resources and student
ability strongly affect successful learning.' The authors' significant discovery
is a third factor associated with learning-effective school organization, which
accounts for a quarter of the variance in achievement that the authors' regres-
sion model explains.' The discovery is significant because organization may
be more sensitive to public policy than are wealth and ability.
The authors' measure of "effective school organization" is not an estab-
lished metric in educational research, however, but rather their own inven-
tion.24 Actually, the authors use two measures of effective organization. The
first is a composite of: (1) students' satisfaction with the fairness and effective-
ness of their school's disciplinary mechanisms; (2) teachers' feelings of "effica-
ciousness" vis-A-vis their students, "collegiality" and "cooperativeness" vis- t-
vis each other, "clarity" vis-A-vis their principals' "vision" and goals, and
"influence" vis-a-vis school policy; and (3) principals' confidence in the
excellence of their teachers, commitment to academic excellence as opposed
to assuring literacy, and dedication to running their schools as opposed to
advancing their careers.'
The authors' second measure of effective organization adds one additional
factor---"academic program," i.e., the proportion of students in a school who
are enrolled in an academic as opposed to a "general" or a vocational course
of study.26 Although it is not surprising that students in academic programs
score higher on academic tests than students in nonacademic programs, the
authors are interested in why students enroll in one or the other program. In
their first regression analysis-of the factors associated with student achieve-
22. Using the authors' preferred analysis, student ability as well as family and school socioeconomic
status (essentially, parents' income and educational attainment) together account for three-fourths of the
variance in achievement explained by their regression analysis. Pp. 125-29 & tbl. 4-8, 139; see also pp.
126-28 (describing authors' method, followed herein, of figuring proportion of variance explained by
independent variables). But cf. RICHARD J. MURNANE, THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL REsOURCES ON THE
LEARNING OF INNER CrrY CHILDREN 5-30 (1975) (criticizing this methodology).
23. P. 126 & tbl. 4-8. A possibly embarrassing feature of the authors' regression analysis of achieve-
ment is that it explains so little-only 5% of the variance in student achievement. See pp. 126 tbl. 4-8, 132-
33 tbl. 4-10, 298 n.33. In response to criticism on this score, see Glass & Matthews, supra note 21, at 26;
John F. Witte, Understanding High School Achievement: After a Decade of Research, Do We Have Any
Confident Policy Recommendations? 16, 20 (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Aug. 30, 1990) (on file with author), the authors pose a challenge: "If our
analysis omits any variable that is likely to account for the variation in achievement-gain scores, we are
not aware of it, and none of our critics have [sic] suggested what it might be." John E. Chubb & Terry M.
Moe, A Response to Our Critics, EDUC. WK., Feb. 20, 1991, at 26. But see infra notes 38-75 and accompa-
nying text (discussing variables omitted by Chubb and Moe).
24. "Effective schools" is a term of art in modern educational theory, see Stewart C. Purkey & Marshall
S. Smith, Effective Schools: A Review, 83 ELEMENTARY SCHS. J. 427 (1983), but Chubb and Moe's measure
of "effective school organization" is their own invention.
25. In addition to the factors mentioned in the text, the authors' measure of "school effectiveness" is
a composite of reports about the amount of homework assigned daily, graduation requirements, principals'
relative preference for the pedagogical as opposed to the managerial aspects of their jobs, and teachers'
freedom from administrative "routines and paperwork." Pp. 78-99 & tbls. 3-3 to 3-10, 120-24 & tbl. 4-7,
139, 143.
26. Pp. 120-24, 130-40 & tbl. 4-10.
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ment-the authors find that academic program has explanatory power even after
parental resources and student ability are controlled. Based on this finding, the
authors hypothesize that school traits also influence academic program, and they
sometimes include academic program in their measure of "school organiza-
tion."27
Step 2: The authors conduct a second regression analysis to determine
whether school policy or other factors explain why schools are well organized
according to the authors' first definition of organization-to determine, that is,
why students say they respect the educational enterprise, why teachers say they
are happy with it, and why principals say they are dedicated to it. The authors
again find that certain parent traits (resources and frequency of contact with
schools) and student traits (ability and comportment) account for close to three-
fourths of the variance in the condition under examination (effective organiza-
tion).m Likewise, the authors again discover a policy-sensitive fac-
tor--"absence of bureaucratic influence" or "autonomy"--that accounts for a
quarter of the explained variance in the condition being studied.29 By "autono-
my" the authors mean the propensity of principals to credit or blame them-
selves, rather than unions and central office staff, for their schools' program
and personnel.30
Interestingly, at this second stage of their analysis, the authors introduce
two new parent-student factors-parent contact with schools and student
comportment-that were not studied at the first stage of their analysis and that
seem to reflect the importance that parents and students attach to schooling. The
belated introduction of this new causal factor--"taste" for education-in the
second regression raises the question whether educational taste also might have
proven causal had it been introduced, in some form, in the initial regression
of achievement.
Step 3: The authors conduct a third regression analysis to see whether
manipulable policy, rather than some other factor, determines how much
responsibility principals attribute to themselves as opposed to outsiders. In this
study, parent traits (contact with schools) and student traits (ability, comport-
ment, and achievement gain) explain only 20-30% of the fluctuation in the
dependent variable (autonomy).31 Notably, the authors again introduce a new
student-related causal factor at this stage-achievement gain-again begging
the question whether the factor might have proved causal had it been introduced
27. Pp. 134-40.
28. Pp. 160 tbl. 5-7, 162 tbl. 5-8.
29. Id. School size also modestly affects organization. Id.
30. Pp. 150-57 & tbls. 5-4 to 5-6 ("bureaucratic influence" is a composite of principals' answers to
questions about the influence exercised by central office staff, unions, and seniority policies, relative to
principals' own influence, over curriculum, instructional methods, personnel, and discipline).
31. P. 176 tbl. 5-11.
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in the previous regression. Might student success cause effective organization
(e.g., student and teacher happiness), rather than the reverse?32
By attributing only a modest amount of the variance in school autonomy
(20-30%) to parent-student factors, and a similar amount (20-25%) to nonurban
school location,33 the third regression leads the authors to the pot of gold at
the end of their sophisticated rainbow. The authors discover that school sec-
tor-private as opposed to public control-is highly correlated with school
autonomy, accounting for 45-60% of the variance in autonomy that the authors'
model explains.'
As interesting as it is, the authors' discovery means only that, at best,
private control accounts for three-fifths of one-fourth of one-seventh of the
posited causes of the outcome (achievement) the authors hope to foster. More-
over, given the authors' measure of autonomy, the finding might boil down to
the not-so-surprising discovery that, compared to public schools, private schools
are less unionized, have fewer district-level administrators, and have principals
who, for these and other reasons, take more responsibility for conditions at their
schools and assign less responsibility to outsiders than do their public school
counterparts.
Finally, as highly correlated as private sector is with autonomy and effec-
tive organization, the authors fail to report any correlation between private
control and student achievement. 35 The reason for the authors' unexplained
omission is easy to guess: As other researchers using the same data have
discovered, once other factors are controlled, there is no correlation, or only
a very small one, between private control and achievement. 36
32. See p. 167 (surmising that successful students are easier to manage).
33. P. 176 tbl. 5-11.
34. See id.
35. Pp. 181-82 & thl. 5-13; see Witte, supra note 23, at 21-22 (calling Chubb and Moe's substitution
of transitive logic for statistical demonstration of link between sector and achievement"a sleight-of-hand").
In response to criticism, the authors recently have downplayed the importance of their regression of the
factors affecting achievement gain and of achievement gain generally. Chubb & Moe, supra note 23, at 24,
26. Their book, however, consistently relies on the achievement effects the authors claim to have established
as the principal reason to adopt their policy proposals. See, e.g., pp. 180-81 (market control is solution
because, "[b]y itself," market control fosters autonomy and effective organization, each of which "alone
is capable of shifting student achievement gains by more than one full year during four years of high
school"); see also pp. 23, 35-36, 51-53, 166, 174.
36. See, e.g., Karl L. Alexander & Aaron M. Pallas, School Sector and Cognitive Performance: When
Is a Little a Little, 58 SOC. EDUC. 115, 126 (1985) (almost no difference between Catholic and public
schools); Christopher Jencks, How Much Do High School Students Learn?, 58 SoC. EDUC. 128, 134 (1985)
(small sector effect without controlling for academic track); Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Bryk, A Multilevel
Model of the Social Distribution of High School Achievement, 62 Soc. EDUC. 172 (1988) (no sector effect
after controlling for academic track); Henry M. Levin, The Theory of Choice Applied to Education, in 1
CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 247, 275-76 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds.,
1990) [hereinafter CHOICE AND CONTROL] (minuscule or no effects); Witte, supra note 23, at 22 ("Sector
effects for achievement... are negligible when controls for prior achievement, student background, tracking
and coursetaking are included."); id. at 10, 12-13, 28; cf. Robert Rothman, Debate on Merits of Public,
Private Schools Reignites, EDUC. WK., Sept. 18, 1991, at I (listing recent national test data suggesting that
private and parochial students do no better-and at times do worse-on national tests than socioeconomically
comparable public school students).
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Step 4: The final step in the authors' argument-attributing autonomy to
market forces, as opposed to other private school characteristics-is not sup-
ported by statistical data. Instead, it flows from a theoretical argument: Private
organizations are more autonomous than public ones because the former are
free of the latter's interest group politics. As a result, private schools avoid the
bureaucratic rules that today's winners in the interest group game use to impose
their interests on uncooperative employees and to make it difficult for tomor-
row's winners, if they unseat today's, to stop serving the interests of previous
winners.37 Having escaped the influence of an electorate full of greedy inter-
ests, the only demands private schools need serve are the more "homogeneous"
desires of their schools-focused clientele. This simpler task permits a good bit
of administrative flexibility and reliance on the unconstrained judgment of the
professionals the schools employ.
B. The Statistical Story Studied
Researchers frequently advance the hypotheses that three factors-parental
resources, student ability, and parent and student tastes for education-largely
determine educational achievement,38 and that studies identifying other, policy-
driven causes of achievement simply mislabel measures of the elusive third
factor (tastes) as indicia of the favored policy.39
In this section, I argue that Chubb and Moe may have succumbed to the
same mislabeling error, and may have exacerbated the error by treating attitudi-
nal effects of successful achievement as additional policy-driven causes of that
achievement. As a result, the authors may inaccurately deflate the importance
of personal causes of achievement and inflate the importance of programmatic
causes, thus overstating the value of their own market-driven program.
1. Step 1: Is Academic Program a Cause of Achievement or a Proxy for
Motivation; Is Organization a Cause of Achievement, or Its Effect?
The authors confirm that achievement is strongly correlated with parental
resources and student ability, and acknowledge that taste for education may
37. Pp. 29-35.
38. See Witte, supra note 23, at 3-6, 10, 12-16, 22 & tbl. 1, fig. 1 (reviewing literature supporting this
hypothesis).
39. See Anthony S. Bryk et al., High School Organization and Its Effects on Teachers and Students:
An Interpretive Summary of the Research, in I CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 135, 160-61; Arthur
S. Goldberger & Glen G. Cain, The Causal Analysis of Cognitive Outcomes in the Coleman, Hoffer and
Kilgore Report, 55 SOC. EDUC. 103 (1982); Levin, supra note 36, at 247, 275; Witte, supra note 23, at 4,
28-29. On the elusiveness of educational tastes, see pp. 111-12, 122-23, 248, 260; Richard J. Murnane,
Evidence, Analysis, and Unanswered Questions, 51 HARv. EDUC. REV. 483, 485-87 (1981) ("Many
researchers have pointed out that the effects of self-selection cannot be controlled even by including a large
number of observed family background characteristics." (citation omitted)); Wilson, supra note 4, at 40,
42.
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have independent causal effect.4 We can further discern the importance of
educational motivations by noting that college admissions officers rate students
on the basis not only of aptitude (SAT scores) and of wealth (tuition and
scholarship policies) but also of grade point average-presumably on the theory
that knowing whether a student is willing to apply herself is important even
after we know that she is intellectually and financially able to do so. Moreover,
it has long been understood that, apart from other socioeconomic characteristics,
parental expectations play an important role in learning.4' Indeed, a well-
developed literature establishes that achievement levels depend not only on
one's own and one's parents' educational expectations, but also on the expecta-
tions of one's schoolmates and their parents.42
The authors try to factor out taste for education by using seniors' test scores
as sophomores to measure the seniors' "ability."'43 The authors theorize that
sophomore scores reflect most of the performance boost or drag attributable
to motivations, so that factoring out those scores also factors out most of the
impact of educational tastes.' There are four reasons to question this conclu-
sion.
First, students' and parents' tastes for education do not drop out of the
picture at the end of the tenth grade. They continue affecting performance
during the junior and senior years when the "achievement gains" the authors
study occur.45 Indeed, high school is a time of changing and intensifying
educational motivations: Students with a hankering for college (and parents
hoping to instill one) are busy creating the grade point average on which
40. Pp. 111-12, 122-23, 127-28, 248, 260; see HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at 45 n.2 ("[Parent's]
willingness to make a financial sacrifice for the sake of improving the children's education differs widely
within a given income class, especially at intermediate levels of income."); Murnane, supra note 39, at 485.
41. See Bryk et al., supra note 39, at 135, 155; Witte, supra note 23, at 3-6, 12-13, 22 & tbl. 1, fig.
I.
42. Pp. 109, 118; Bryk et al., supra note 39, at 135, 150-51; James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics:
"All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1624-25 & n.675 (1990); Murnane,
supra note 39, at 486 ("[O]ne of the most effective ways to improve children's cognitive skills is to put
them in an environment with other children who want to acquire cognitive skills and whose families support
such learning.").
43. Pp. 112-18.
44. Pp. 112, 115-18, 248-51, 260-73. The authors support their claim to have winnowed out the effect
of motivation by asserting that they replicated their analysis of student achievement in a separate regression
using only public schools-thus "dropping . . . those students most likely to have [strong educational
motivations]." P. 112; see also p. 248. Because families can exhibit high educational motivation by moving
to the suburbs or opting for academic, rather than general or vocational, public school programs, a study
that excludes private schools hardly washes out the effect of motivation. See p. 33; infra notes 49-52, 74
and accompanying text. In any event, the authors' public-schools-only regression does not unambiguously
replicate their all-schools regression. Compare p. 126 tbl. 4-8 (in authors' most general all-schools
regression, effective organization accounts for 25% of variance in achievement) with p. 261 tbl. D-1 (in
corresponding public-schools-only regression, effective organization accounts for only 16% of variance in
achievement).
45. Pp. 115-16; see Bryk et al., supra note 39, at 135, 155. The authors measure achievement using
"gain scores"-the additional number of right answers achieved by seniors on a test they also took as
sophomores. Cf. Witte, supra note 23, at 24-26 (Chubb and Moe's transformation of their data into gain
scores renders results useless because transformation creates "frightening" amount of measurement error,
accounting for as much as 70% of demonstrated variance in achievement gains).
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college admissions officers will rely. Students with little hankering for school
are experiencing steeply rising boredom curves and are taking advantage of the
many nonacademic opportunities that suddenly are available, ranging from
vocational and fine arts curricula, to athletics and other extracurricular activities,
to part-time jobs, to expanded social lives, to marriage and childbirth, to
hanging out on the streets, to alcohol and drug use, and so on. Parents' lives
and motivations also can change dramatically when their children become old
enough to care for themselves. For these and other reasons, the pre-tenth grade
motivations that sophomore test scores measure can only incompletely reflect
the educational tastes that affect academic performance in the succeeding two
years.
Second, as noted, not only the student's and her parents' educational
motivations, but also those of her classmates and their parents affect academic
performance.46 Because the onset of high school often is a time when students
move from one school to another, it also is a time when students move from
one circle of peers with a particular set of educational tastes to a different circle
with different tastes. However successfully sophomore test scores measure the
educational motivations of the student's family, those scores are unlikely to
measure tastes emanating from the school setting in which sophomores only
recently arrived. Yet those unmeasured tastes are likely to be intensively
experienced by juniors and seniors while the achievement gains the authors
measure are occurring.
Third, even when potential measures of educational tastes are at hand, the
authors do not use them. For example, although the authors notice that students
in high performance schools more frequently report that their parents expect
them to attend college than students in low performance schools, they exclude
parental expectations from their analysis of achievement gains. 47 The authors
thus jettison the only direct, albeit crude, measure of parental motivations that
their data set contains.48
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47. Pp. 108 tbl. 4-5, 296-97 n.17. The 17% difference between low- and high-performing schools on
this measure is comparable in size to differences that elsewhere prompt the authors to include factors in
their regression models. See, e.g., pp. 82 tbl. 3-5, 85-86 tbl. 3-6, 122 ("goal clarity" and "principal's vision"
included based on 16% and 10% differences).
48. See Witte, supra note 23, at 4 tbl. 1 (using same data set as Chubb and Moe to show that a
mother's expectations in regard to her child's future college attendance has substantially more impact on
past achievement than family income, parents' education, number of books in home, and all other factors
measured, except ethnicity). Chubb and Moe also might have gauged motivations using measures of parental
contact with schools and student comportment-factors that the authors concede reflect students' and
parents' attitudes towards education and that the authors rely upon in their second, but not in this first,
regression analysis. Pp. 96-98 tbl. 3-10, 160 tbl. 5-7, 164, 298 n.28. Additional measures of parent and
student motivation that researchers besides Chubb and Moe have extracted from the data set include
frequency of parent-child discussions about the latter's experiences (which has as much impact on achieve-
ment as mother's education and more impact than family income) and students' college aspirations in grades
6-11 (which correlate with achievement and private school attendance). See Anthony S. Bryk, Disciplined
Inquiry or Policy Argument, 51 HARV. EDUC. REV. 497, 501-03 (1981); Witte, supra note 23, at 4 tbl. I,
15-16, 34 n.18.
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Finally, the authors label what look like pretty good proxies for parent and
student motivations as measures of other things. The best example is the
authors' treatment of "academic program," i.e., the proportion of students
enrolled in academic as opposed to general or vocational courses. The authors
sometimes include academic program in their measure of "effective organiza-
tion," rather than attributing program to student and parent influences, thus
doubling the impact of organization on achievement.49
Although school policies surely have something to do with the programs
in which students enroll, it is hard to imagine those policies having as much
impact on program choices as the students' and their parents' own tastes for,
or aversion to, academics.5" Moreover, the motivations of a student's and her
parents' peers within the school setting may well surpass school policy as the
second most important factor. The authors thus attribute the effect on achieve-
ment of students' program choices to a school policy that they themselves
acknowledge (in an appendix) is only a secondary or tertiary determinant of
program choices, ranking well behind student ability and parental motiva-
tions.51 When academic track is removed from the organization measure and
included among the parent-student factors, the latter factors account for 86%
of the variance in achievement that the authors' model explains, leaving only
14% of the variance to be explained by what the authors conceive of as school-
related, hence, policy-sensitive factors.5"
Turning, then, to that remaining 14% of the variance, recall that, apart from
academic program, what the authors label as "effective school organization"
actually has less to do with policy than with the satisfaction levels of students,
teachers, and principals. According to Chubb and Moe, a school is well organ-
ized: (1) if its students report that the school has fair disciplinary procedures;
(2) if its teachers report that they feel responsible for the success or failure of
their students, that they wield a lot of influence over school policy, that they
49. Pp. 93-95, 131-40. The well-established impact of academic program on academic achievement
has led some researchers to suggest that requiring students to take academic courses would substantially
improve performance. See Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Bryk, Curriculum Tracking as Mediating the Social
Distribution of High School Achievement, 61 Sot.. EDUC. 78 (1988); Witte, supra note 23, at 10, 12-16,
22, 26. Both Chubb and Moe's theory that academic program is a function of effective organization and
my own view that academic program is a function of motivations suggest that this simple reform would
not work.
50. See Witte, supra note 23, at 15-16, 26-27, 34 n.18.
51. P. 254 tbl. C-3; see id. (student ability, parental expectations in regard to children's college
attendance, and family socioeconomic status have 3 times more impact on program choices than effective
organization has). By the authors' own estimate, the combined impact of effective organization on academic
program and of academic program on achievement is so small that even the hopelessly ambitious policy
feat of elevating children from the 13th to the 88th percentile of well-organized schools would only improve
their achievement by 7/100ths of a grade equivalent each year. P. 256 tbl. C4. Moreover, the authors may
inflate even the modest impact on program choices that their regression analysis attributes to effective
organization by giving organization credit for what may be the impact of student educational tastes. Compare
p. 254 tbl. C-3 (including effective organization but omitting any direct measure of student motivations in
regression of factors associated with student program choices) with p. 160 tbl. 5-7 (student comportment-a
rough proxy for student motivations-accounts for close to one-quarter of variance in effective organization).
52. Pp. 130-33 & tbl. 4-10.
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get along and cooperate well with each other, that administrative "routines and
paperwork" only rarely intrude on their work, and that their principal knows
what kind of school she wants, values innovation and new ideas, and keeps the
school apprised of where it is going; and (3) if the school's principal reports
that she focuses more attention on achieving academic excellence among
students than upon achieving basic literacy skills, attaches more importance to
gaining control of the school than to advancing her career, values the pedagogi-
cal more than the managerial aspects of her job, and employs excellent teach-
ers.
53
As with "academic program," these other indicators of school organization
seem only partially, and perhaps secondarily, related to school policy. It is no
doubt true that actual disciplinary procedures determine students' views on the
subject, actual allocations of authority determine how much power teachers
wield, and actual personnel and pedagogical policies determine whether teachers
are "excellent" and "efficacious." But it seems equally true that other fac-
tors-most particularly student achievement itself-play an important role in
determining students', teachers', and principals' reports in these regards.
Is it not likely, for example, that students who are learning well in school
will express confidence in the school's procedures? That teachers of successful
students will feel (or want to feel) responsible for their students' progress,
influential in setting the schools' apparently effective policies, and respectful
of their colleagues, and will believe that their professional endeavors are too
important to be called "routines and paperwork?" And that principals who run
schools full of successful students will report that their teachers perform well
and that pedagogical success is important to their sense of self, and will convey
a strong sense of mission in regard to the successes that their students achieve?
Conversely, is it not likely that students who do poorly in school will have little
respect for school policies, that their teachers will be ill-disposed to take
responsibility for the students' disappointing outcomes and otherwise to feel
good about their jobs and colleagues, and that principals directing schools with
high concentrations of poor performers will, for that reason alone, rate their
teachers less effective, invest less of their self-image in their students' academic
success, and have difficulty conveying a sense of mission?
Psychological theories aside, different levels of student success dictate
different educational policies. Principals directing schools full of students from
poor families with modest educational aspirations might well be charged with
malpractice-or at least with confusing carts and horses-if they placed
academic excellence too far ahead of literacy on their list of priorities.54
Likewise, the managerial tasks required of principals in schools full of under-
achievers may be greater than those needed in schools full of overachievers,
53. Pp. 78-99 & tbls. 3-3 to 3-10, 120-24 & tbl. 4-7; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
54. See p. 82 ("Naturally, schools with bright students may find it easier than schools without such
students to focus on academic excellence.").
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thus explaining selection techniques that place managerially oriented principals
in the former but not in the latter schools. Finally, all else being equal, excellent
teachers, who presumably have the most control over where they teach, can be
expected to gravitate to schools with higher achieving children, hence lower
psychic costs.
Put most simply, there is reason to wonder whether the authors' Step 1
discovery boils down to two not very interesting propositions: that parent and
student motivations affect learning, and that schools full of strong perform-
ers-i.e., schools full of relatively wealthy, talented, and highly motivated
students-have happier clients and professionals than schools full of weak
performers. If this description is accurate, then the authors have done policy-
makers no great favor by dressing up motivations and satisfaction levels in the
guise of "school organization," and by misidentifying a personal cause and an
attitudinal effect of achievement as instead a single programmatic cause of that
outcome.
2. Step 2: Is Autonomy a Cause of School Organization or Another Proxy
for Motivation?
If the hypotheses posed above were correct-if achievement were in part
a consequence of educational tastes and if client-professional satisfaction were
a consequence, not a cause, of student achievement-then motivations might,
and achievement should, show up in Chubb and Moe's Step 2 regression of the
causes of effective organization (minus academic program). The authors,
however, continue using incomplete measures of motivation and entirely fail
to analyze the impact of achievement (which they consider an effect, not a
cause, of organization). Nonetheless, the authors' Step 2 findings strengthen the
suspicion that their analysis undervalues educational tastes and reverses cause
and effect.
In the authors' second regression analysis (of factors related to school
organization), family resources and student ability account for about a third of
the variance that the model explains.5 Another third of the variance is ex-
plained by two measures of parent and student motivations that the authors
introduce in their analysis for the first time. 6 Although welcome, these mea-
sures almost certainly underrate the importance of motivations. While acknowl-
edging that the educational attitudes that parents express to teachers and
principals at school probably have a much smaller impact on educational
outcomes than the attitudes parents display to students at home,57 the authors
limit their measure of parental motivations to an index of parent-school contact.
The authors' measure of student motivations-infrequency of disciplinary
55. P. 160 tbl. 5-7.
56. Id.
57. P. 164; see Bryk et al., supra note 39, at 135, 155-56.
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problems-is similarly incomplete. Although misbehavior is one way in which
students show that they do not care much for academics, it is too extreme a
manifestation to pick up most gradations of educational taste.
The authors focus most of their Step 2 attention on "autonomy" or "bureau-
cracy" levels, to which they attribute about a quarter of the variance in school
organization s The authors define autonomy as the extent to which principals
take responsibility for school policy rather than attributing it to outside ac-
tors. 9 Because schools with "effective organization" tend to have high-achiev-
ing students, and schools with "ineffective organization" tend to have low-
achieving students,6" the authors' discovery may translate into a finding that
principals in schools with successful students tend to take credit for the schools'
and the students' accomplishments, while principals in schools with unsuccess-
ful students tend to attribute part of the blame to central office staff and unions.
Just as "school organization" may reflect satisfaction levels rather than
pedagogical policy, "school autonomy" may reflect something other than
governance policy, namely, student educational tastes and success rates. Like
the rest of us, administrators are probably more willing to take credit for good
things than to accept blame for bad things. This tendency is particularly strong
where, as here, no one understands very well how desirable outcomes are
achieved and, accordingly, where no transparent standards are available for
assessing credit and blame. 1 The same point can be made programmatically:
Students with low educational motivation bring many problems to school that
students with strong educational tastes do not bring; and schools with more
problems require more management and outside assistance (in the form, for
example, of compensatory education programs, vocational and special education
assistance, dropout prevention activities, and birth control and AIDS counseling)
than do schools with few problems.62
Instead of ruling out the possibility that the authors' Step I analysis misla-
beled an attitudinal effect of achievement (client-professional satisfaction) as
a programmatic cause ("effective school organization"), the authors' Step 2
analysis of effective organization appears to mischaracterize another attitudinal
effect of successful students (principals' responsibility-taking) as another
programmatic cause ("school autonomy").
58. Pp. 160 tbl. 5-7, 162 tbl. 5-8.
59. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
60. Pp. 126, 130-33 & tbl. 4-10.
61. See James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal
Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 349, 390-91 & n.138 (1990)
(courts have refused to recognize "educational malpractice" cause of action because facilitating learning
in classroom is "skill" for which no objective standards exist).
62. See pp. 62-64, 168-70.
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3. Step 3: Is Private Control a Cause of Autonomy or Another Proxy for
Motivation?
In setting out to determine what makes schools autonomous or bureaucratic,
Chubb and Moe acknowledge a possibility that their Step 2 analysis
ignores-that student achievement is a cause, not an effect, of the school traits
on which they focus their attention. In one of the authors' regression analyses
of autonomy, moreover, achievement gains do account for some of the variance
that their model explains." From the authors' standpoint, however, the impor-
tant Step 3 finding is not how powerfully, but how weakly, parent and student
characteristics (parental resources and contact with schools; student ability,
achievement gains, and comportment) correlate with autonomy
levels-accounting for only 20-30% of the variance. The remainder of the
impact on autonomy is split between two factors: "private control" and
"[non]urban location," which account, respectively, for 45-60% and 20-25%
of the explained variance.' Put bluntly, private school principals and, to a
lesser extent, suburban principals give themselves the credit for school policy;
urban principals blame central office and the union.
Again, one can give psychological and programmatic explanations for this
phenomenon. Urban schools have a lot of problems; private and suburban
schools do not. Urban principals may be happy to share the blame for their
problems; private and suburban principals may want the credit for their schools'
successes. Solving urban schools' problems may require lavish management
and administration; keeping private and suburban schools running may require
less.
But passing these explanations, let me pose a question the authors do not
adequately answer: What, besides autonomy, do private and suburban schools
have in common? A tempting response is "market discipline" or the threat of
"exit"--imposed by mobile customers in the private school case and mobile
residents in the suburban case. The authors convincingly reject this claim,
however, noting that residential mobility does not approach the product-wise
mobility needed to make markets work. 65 Notwithstanding their affinity for
63. P. 176 tbl. 5-11. The authors thus find that student achievement is about 10% of the posited cause
of school autonomy, which is 25% of the posited cause of school organization (minus academic program),
which is 14% of the posited cause of student achievement. What use policymakers can make of such findings
is unclear.
64. Pp. 171, 176 tbl. 5-11.
65.
[RIesidential mobility ... tend[s] to promote the kind of matching that occurs in
markets; but it is a very rough and inadequate approximation to the real thing, even
for those citizens affluent enough to move where they want when they want. In
general, residential decisions involve many factors in addition to education... and,
once they are made, the financial costs and personal adjustments entailed by moving
are quite high. Low or declining educational quality need not keep parents from
moving into an area, and it is even less likely to prompt existing residents to pick
up and leave.
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market-based explanations of success, therefore, the authors acknowledge the
need for a non-exit-based explanation for suburban school autonomy, and they
give the one sketched above: Relatively speaking, suburban schools have
"'nice"' environments and student bodies and thus are relatively trouble free. 6
What the authors ignore is that the same reasoning explains the autonomous
conditions that private school principals report. Indeed, because the vast
majority of private and parochial schools are in the suburbs,67 those schools
begin with the "nice" edge that assertedly is sufficient to make public suburban
schools autonomous-leaving the private schools' acknowledged ability, in
addition, to attract especially motivated students68 to ice the "niceness" cake.
Private and suburban schools share another trait, however: Literally or
figuratively, their patrons fled the city schools. And they did so at substantial
educationally targeted cost to themselves. Private school customers gave up a
large public subsidy in favor of often steep private tuitions; suburban school
patrons moved to districts with (by comparison to industrialized cities) small
property tax bases requiring stout levy rates to support their "nice" public
schools.6 9 What, then, do private and suburban schools have in common? The
answer seems to be that both sets of schools are populated by parents and
students who, in the clearest possible way-cash on the barrel head, and a lot
of it-have manifested well-developed tastes for education. By definition,
therefore, private and suburban school patrons are veritable "educational
connoisseurs."
That private control has a stronger effect than nonurban location supports
an educational-tastes hypothesis. Private schools act as a sponge for educational
motivations in two ways, the first of which applies more strongly to private
schools, and the second of which applies only to private schools. First, by
entirely forsaking the public subsidy and paying tuition, private school parents
evidence a stronger preference for education than suburban parents, who derive
some subsidy from the taxes nonparent patrons pay. Second, unlike nearly all
public schools, private schools themselves sort prospective students on the basis
of educational tastes.7" Private school admissions personnel can be expected
to prefer-even over highly talented applicants-applicants who themselves,
and whose parents, display a commitment to the educational enterprise. Not
P. 33; see infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
66. Pp. 24, 62-66, 183-84, 190-91.
67. See Witte, supra note 23, at 28 & tbl. 10.
68. P. 112.
69. See, e.g., Declaration of James E. Coleman, Executive Director of Financial Services for the School
District of Kansas City, Missouri at 3, Jenkins v. Missouri, 731 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (No. 77-
0420-CV-W-4) (on average, tax levy rates in suburban Kansas City school districts are 22% higher than
in urban Kansas City district; in some suburban districts, levy rates are 30-70% higher than in urban district).
70. See Murnane, supra note 39, at 486 ("[S]electing the right mix of students is a powerful way to
improve the effectiveness of an educational program," and private schools do just that by "provid[ing]
primarily college preparatory instruction to children they select and whose parents select them."); Witte,
supra note 23, at 28-29 tbl. 11.
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only, therefore, do well-developed educational tastes "cause" private schools,
by propelling educational connoisseurs to pool their educationally directed
resources there. In addition, private schools "cause" high educational tastes by
selecting clients who evidence especially high levels of connoisseurship.71
If any traits can be expected to act as proxies for educational tastes, those
traits are private school attendance and suburban school location. Suggestively,
those two factors account for more of the variance (70-80%) than any other
factor examined in the authors' three regression analyses.
If anything, therefore, each step in Chubb and Moe's odyssey of statistical
analysis brings them closer to the conclusion that educational tastes play an
important role in all manner of educational outcomes. Aggregating the proxies
for educational tastes that can be extracted from the authors' analysis permits
the conclusion that: (1) educational motivations measured by a composite of
private sector, nonurban location, parent contact with schools, and student
comportment account for 90% of the variance in autonomy that the authors'
study explains; (2) educational motivations measured by a composite of school
autonomy, parent-school contact, and student comportment account for nearly
60% of the explained variance in school organization; and (3) educational
motivations measured by a composite of academic program and client-profes-
sional satisfaction account for as much as 25% of the explained variance in
achievement.
One troubling question remains-a question that presents as serious a
problem for a tastes-focused interpretation of the authors' data as it does for
their own markets-focused interpretation. If private control is such a good proxy
for educational tastes-or, we might ask Chubb and Moe, if private control is
so strongly related to the prerequisites for achievement-why is there such a
weak correlation (if any) between private control and achievement?72
The authors offer no answer to this question, but one can be imagined: It
is not private control, but rather effective organization, that promotes achieve-
ment; private control is simply the best way to foster effective organization.
This answer explains why private control has no impact on achievement in
studies that take effective organization into account, but it does not satisfactorily
explain why private control has so little impact on achievement in studies that
leave effective organization out of account.73
71. Thus, the level of success private schools achieve with the students they now select could not
possibly accompany a plan, such as the authors', in which most private school students would mainly be
children whom private schools now reject. Predicting otherwise is analogous to predicting that if members
of Yale's football team somehow gained admission to the training program of the American Ballet Theater
they would have a good chance of becoming professional ballet dancers.
72. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 36. The modesty of the contribution that private control makes to effective
organization, and that effective organization makes to achievement, may explain the minimal impact of
private control on achievement in studies that do not account for effective organization. This explanation,
however, hardly commends private control to policymakers seeking ways to improve achievement.
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There is an alternative answer. It is not private control, but rather parent
and student motivations, that promote achievement. And, while enrollment in
private schools is a good proxy for those motivations, the proportion of students
enrolled in academic programs is a more encompassing proxy, which does
correlate with achievement and could easily wash out the explanatory power
of private schools in a regression that controls for both.74 This answer explains
why private control has no impact on achievement in studies that take academic
program into account, and may also explain why private control has some,
albeit slight, impact on achievement in studies that do not account for academic
program but use other fairly encompassing controls (among them, controls not
used by Chubb and Moe) for parent and student motivations. 75
4. Step 4: Is Choice the Motive Force?
The authors' statistical analysis ends with Step 3, but their interpretive
momentum carries them a step further. They conclude that market discipline
resulting from the threat of parental exit, rather than some other attribute of
private schools, accounts for those schools' success. 76 Here again, the authors'
analysis does not rule out an alternative hypothesis-that educational success
coincides with the absence, and not with a surfeit, of market constraint. To
begin with, suburban schools do relatively well pedagogically, even though the
high cost of residential relocation substantially shields those schools from the
threat of exit. 7
Second, private school patrons have less choice-and their schools need
worry about less exit-than the authors suggest. Theoretically, exit can take
one of two forms. Parents can move from one school to another, or they can
move from one sector (say, private) to another (say, public). In fact, intersect-
oral exit is not realistically available to private school patrons. The bane of all
connoisseurs is that their low regard for cost and their high regard for quality
leaves them with few options among competing products. 78 In the educational
area, this bane takes the form of a preference-driven disability in regard to
intersectoral moves: the bulk of educational alternatives (i.e., public schools)
simply are not meaningful options for most private school patrons.79
74. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. Thus, enrolling in a private school is simply one
way of enrolling in an academic program. One can test this hypothesis by seeing whether academic program
makes the same contribution to achievement in studies that include private schools and those that do not.
The authors confirm that academic program has the same impact on achievement in regression analyses
of all schools and of public schools only. Compare pp. 132-33 tbl. 4-10 with pp. 264-65 tbl. D-2.
75. The relevant studies are cited supra note 36. The factors those studies use to control for parent
and student motivations are discussed supra note 48 and accompanying text.
76. Pp. 180-82.
77. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
78. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at 50-51; infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
79. See also Jack Tweedie et al., Should Market Forces Control Educational Decision Making?, 84
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 549, 556-57 (1990) (arguing that private school patrons have few intrasectoral options).
[Vol. 101: 259
Voice, Not Choice
Third, the segment of the education market in which exit is most common
and least constrained-the urban public schools-is also the segment in which
performance is worst. Urban public schools know from long experience that
they are constantly at risk of losing their educational-connoisseur patrons, that
they alone face flight-encouraging urban blight and school desegregation, that
they alone compete with all sectors of the educational market (particularly now
that urban open-enrollment programs invite intrasectoral competition), and that,
until recently, they faced the persistent threat of FHA-subsidized outmigration
to the suburbs by disgruntled patrons (a subsidy explicitly denied intraurban
migrants).80 Yet, as Chubb and Moe document, the result of this surfeit of
disciplining choice on the part of patrons of public schools-discipline largely
denied the public schools' private and suburban competitors-has been educa-
tional decline and even disaster.81
The threat of exit and the stimulus to achievement do not necessarily
coincide. They may even repel. The authors' analysis thus provides no credible
basis either for adopting their exciting answer to the question of what causes
achievement-that market-driven policies make a difference-or for ruling out
the more traditional and depressing answer-that policy-resistant nurture and
nature control. The next part of this Review argues that seeking a more credible
basis for the authors' program is probably futile because even if market forces
could promote autonomy, effective organization, and achievement, those forces
could not be harnessed to elementary and secondary education at an affordable
social cost. Part HI then explains why the policy implications of the traditional,
motivations-focused answer to the question of what causes learning may not
be so depressing after all.
H. WHAT PRICE CHOICE?
Choice proposals for educating children have been around for centuries. 2
During the last thirty-five years, Milton Friedman and John Coons have pro-
posed voucher plans,83 and James Coleman has promoted tuition tax credits.'
80. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1515-16 n.258; Paul E. Peterson, Monopoly and Competition in
American Education, in I CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 66-68; infra note 146 and accompanying
text.
81. Pp. 7-8.
82. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa of Theology, in ON LAW, MORALITY AND ETHICS 63 (William
P. Baumgarth & Richard 3. Regan eds., 1988); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 31-32 (1987)
(John Locke's views); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL: THREE ESSAYS 128-31 (Richard
Vollheim ed., 1985); Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF T. PAINE 258,485-93 (Moncure
D. Conway ed., 1967); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 737 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937); George
H. Smith, Nineteenth-Century Opponents of State Education: Prophets of Modern Revisionism, in THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL MONOPOLY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION AND THE STATE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
109 (Robert B. Everhart ed., 1982).
83. JoHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY
CONTROL (1978); Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).
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What Chubb and Moe add to the policymaking landscape is a plan for privat-
ization within the public context-a plan to preserve a modicum of public
control in order to deflect the social stratification charges made against prior
plans.15
Like the authors' statistical arguments, their policy specifications are
sophisticated and finely tuned. On the one hand, the authors advocate a degree
of public control. On the other hand, they insist that the market be relatively
free on both the demand and supply sides: Parents and children must be free
to choose schools, and schools must be free to select and expel students. The
tricky question, then, is just how free a market is free enough without being
too, inequitably, free. In answer to that question, this part concludes that the
"public good" nature of an educated public makes a fully free market unthink-
able, and that constitutional, educational, and equity problems make the authors'
plan and other proposals for partially free markets unworkable and undesirable.
A. Just So Free, and No More: The Limited Market for a Partially
Public Good
The first thing to acknowledge is how little we know about how educational
markets could and should work. Whether or not one accepts Chubb and Moe's
interpretation of their study, it tells us next to nothing about how schools might
function in a free (or freer) market. Indeed, the most salient trait of the current
educational market is how unfree it is.
To begin with, unlike the typical consumer in a free market who can spend
money or save it and stay home, the educational consumer has no legal choice
but to spend opportunity capital (if not money) on thirteen years of school-
ing.86 Lacking experience in deciding whether to spend capital on schooling,
84. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE
SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982). In the past year, a number of similar plans have been proposed. Former
Governor Pete du Pont proposed an uncapped voucher plan to the Delaware legislature, see Amy S. Wells,
A Bold Plan for Choice in Delaware's Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 199 1, at B Il; the Wisconsin legislature
adopted (and a court promptly struck down) a plan paying for 1% of Milwaukee's low-income children to
attend private nonsectarian schools, see William Celis, State Plan for Choice of Schools Is Voided, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1990, at B8; a California businessman initiated a well-financed ballot initiative campaign
to enshrine a knock-off of Chubb and Moe's choice proposal in the California Constitution, see Lynn Olson,
California Businessman's Drive for Choice Sparking Battle, EDUC. WK., Sept. 18, 1991, at 1; and President
Bush prodded states to pay for students to attend private schools and proposed a partial voucher plan
allowing federal assistance to follow children to private and parochial schools, see supra note 5. But cf.
Susan Chira, A Sea of Doubt Swells Around Bush's Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1991, at A12.
On the other hand, Oregon voters overwhelmingly rejected a well-funded ballot initiative to adopt a choice
plan modeled after Chubb and Moe's. See William R. Kincaid & Jonathan E. Meyer, Note, Pushing
Constitutional and Political Limits: The Oregon Educational Choice Initiative, 7 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming
October 1991). See generally Lynn Olson, Proposals for Private School Choice Reviving at All Levels of
Government, EDUC. WK., Feb. 20, 1991, at 1.
85. See pp. 217-19; supra note 16 and accompanying text. President Bush's proposal to create hundreds
of new public schools follows Chubb and Moe's model. See Abigail Thernstrom, Out-classed, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 13, 1991, at 12.
86. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1637-40, 1649-50.
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the typical educational consumer also knows next to nothing about how to do
so. The combination of the 100% subsidy that 90% of all educational customers
currently use and the public schools' traditional mandatory assignment policy
means that price and quality shopping by consumers, as well as advertising by
providers, are rare events save at the high end of the market.8 7
Compulsory attendance and public subsidization distinguish the existing
educational market from a free market in another way: In addition to giving
many young citizens an education they do not want and (given the choice)
would refuse to pay for, and giving other citizens an education they want but
cannot pay for, the existing system forces still other citizens to pay for an
education they do not want, do not receive, and have no interest in providing
to others. Throw in the fact that education is virtually the only good or service
that any (and, in fact, nearly all) of the country's fifty-one constitutions affirma-
tively makes the state provide, 88 and it becomes clear that education is differ-
ent from all other objects of consumption in this country. What sense does it
make, finally, to think in free-market terms about a good that the state forces
unwilling purchasers to purchase and unwilling consumers to consume?
The second thing to realize is that no responsible policymaker wants the
free educational market we currently don't have. No credible policymaker
would be willing to consign educational consumption and expenditures to
whatever, and only so much as, the market will bear. Whether to prepare young
adults for self-government,8 9 to inaugurate them into a pluralistic society,9"
to empower them to make the kinds of moral choices that Chubb and Moe
think should drive the educational system, 91 to assure the existence of a mini-
mally productive work force,92 to promote social reproduction in some other
way, or just to keep kids off the street part of the time, the state is going to
make children attend school. And because the state makes them do so against
their wills (and for the social reproduction reasons just discussed), the state is
going to define the content of that education and provide it for free, courtesy
of you and me.93
In a world in which minimum levels of consumption (by some) and
purchase (by others) are compelled-a world in which an educated public, if
not education itself, is treated as a "public good"9----only three market free-
87. See id. at 1650 & n.803; Peterson, supra note 80, at 53 tbl. 2.2 (just under 10% of American high
school students attend private schools).
88. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1494-95 & n.156.
89. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
90. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77-78 (1979).
91. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 240 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
92. See, e.g., id. at 221 (majority opinion).
93. See GUtmANN, supra note 82 (discussing social reproduction function that education serves in all
societies and refuting view that education could and should be limited to cognitive development free of
social aims).
94.
Public goods are ... goods which are consumed by all those who are members of a given
community.., in such a manner that consumption or use by one member does not detract from
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doms potentially remain: the consumer's freedom to decide how much (but not
how little) to spend on education; the consumer's freedom to decide where to
attend school; and the provider's freedom (subject to constitutional antidiscrimi-
nation restrictions95) to decide which students to enroll. The next three sections
explain why it is not possible, using only these three market freedoms, to
construct anything resembling a choice-driven educational market at a tolerable
social cost.
B. Just So Free and No Less: Uncapped Vouchers, Tax Credits, and
Class Segregation
Choice proponents seeking to preserve all three market freedoms advocate
either uncapped vouchers or tuition tax credits-mechanisms that lack a ceiling
on the amount parents can spend on their children's education. Although Chubb
and Moe reject such plans on equity grounds, brief consideration of them will
facilitate discussion of the authors' proposal.
The first problem with uncapped choice mechanisms is a legal one, al-
though understanding its implications necessitates a return to Chubb and Moe's
statistical study. A majority of the private schools the authors studied are
Catholic schools. 96 Most researchers using the same data have concluded that
the data allow no useful generalizations about private schools other than
Catholic schools because of the small number of non-Catholic private schools
surveyed and the disproportionate number of those schools that serve elite and
specialized populations whose patterns of achievement may not generalize to
other children.9 7 Any publicly funded choice plan that excludes Catholic
schools accordingly threatens to deny children access to an important-some
would say the only--segment of the private sector with even a partially demon-
strated capacity to improve existing educational services. The difficulty, of
course, is that the Constitution may exclude parochial schools from publicly
funded choice plans.
Determining what publicly funded educational arrangements the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits is difficult at present, because the Supreme Court's
consumption or use by another. Standard examples have been crime prevention and national
defense as well as.. . advanced standards of literacy .... The distinguishing characteristic of
these goods is not only that they can be consumed by everyone, but that there is no escape from
consuming them ....
HIRscHMAN, supra note 17, at 101; see Levin, supra note 36, at 251; David B. Tyack, The Public Schools:
A Monopoly or a Contested Public Domain?, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL., supra note 36, at 86, 89 (noting
"long American tradition of regarding education as a common good").
95. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
96. See p. 27.
97. See COLEMAN Er AL, supra note 84, at 13; Bryk et al., supra note 39, at 190-91, 197-98 n.72
("Many of the positive effects associated with Catholic schools are not characteristic of non-Catholic private
schools," including the "unusual effectiveness of Catholic high schools for at-risk youth."); Goldberger &
Cain, supra note 39; Witte, supra note 23, at 6-7, 18-19, 36 n.27.
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jurisprudence is in flux.98 It may be worthwhile, however, to consider whether
plans will invite sufficiently serious constitutional challenge under existing
doctrine to frustrate implementation while the Supreme Court sorts out the
matter.
Voucher plans are attractive in theory because giving each child a coupon
worth the price of a "minimally adequate" education is an administratively easy
way to make private schools accessible to all children-including the poor and
working class children who are most systematically neglected by the status
quo.99 Unfortunately, the full-funding and administrative virtues of voucher
plans from social and educational standpoints are vices from a constitutional
standpoint. At the point the parochial school redeems its vouchers (no pun
intended), the plan calls for the state unconstitutionally to provide large
amounts and proportions of funding directly to a religious school."° Even
if states attempt to disguise the redemption process by retroactively reimbursing
parents for amounts spent on religious schools, prospectively giving parents
grants for the same purpose, or otherwise seeking to pass the subsidy through
the parent, the Court's precedents pose obstacles.'0 ' Nor can churches-at
98. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Compare Can Vouchers Hurdle
Church-State Wall?, N.Y. TiNiEs, June 12, 1991, at B5 (quoting constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe:
"'One would have to be awfully clumsy to write [educational] voucher legislation that could not pass
constitutional scrutiny."') with Charles Fried, The Once and Future Court, N.Y. TiMES, July 7, 1991, at
ElI ("Voucher plans that would allow parents to use tax dollars to choose ... church-affiliated schools"
are "likely to divide even the Reagan and Bush appointees to the Court," and "there is no predicting the
outcomel]."). For the time being, the prevailing Establishment Clause proscription is against state action
that "'convey[s] or attempts to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is preferred."'
Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-71 (1990) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38,70 (1985)). This test requires an inquiry into whether the law or practice has the purpose orprimary
effect of advancing religion and, possibly, whether it entangles the state in the affairs of religious organiza-
tions. See id. at 2370-71 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)); cf. Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688, 698 (1990) (dicta questioning "entanglements" test).
Some state constitutional provisions pose even higher barriers to parochial school participation in publicly
funded choice plans than does the First Amendment. Compare Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771
P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wash. 1989) (state constitutional proscription against public money being "'applied to
any religious ... instruction"' forbids state to reimburse blind student for Bible college tuition under
program helping handicapped individuals obtain job skills (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; emphasis
added by court)) with Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding
state aid to same student under First Amendment).
99. See Chubb & Hanushek, supra note 6, at 239-40.
100. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1985) ("[O]ur... cases have
struck down attempts by States to make payments out of public tax dollars directly to primary or secondary
religious educational institutions .... ); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) ("[T]he means by
which state assistance flows to private schools is of some importance .... "); id. at 403-04 n. 1 ("[D]irect
financial subsidies are forbidden .... ); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 780 (1973) ("[Dlirect aid in whatever form is invalid .... ); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 611-13; Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) ("direct money subsid[ies]" to parochial schools are "pregnant
with" potentially unconstitutional involvement in religious affairs); infra note 194 and accompanying text.
But cf. Committee of Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding state
program reimbursing parochial schools for costs of state-mandated tests).
101. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 n.4, 488 (1986);
Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 393-94, 396; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 827, 832 (1973); Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 785-86. But cf. Volman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (states may loan instructional materials to
parochial students); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (states may reimburse parents
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least without giving up the power to select their own teachers-avoid the
problem by subsidizing their schools' religious endeavors and using voucher
funding for secular instruction only.102
Regardless of its constitutionality, the possibility of publicly mandated,
hence bureaucratically enforced, segregation of secular and nonsecular funding,
instruction, and other activities-and especially the possibility of publicly
controlled hiring and firing-presents a major educational problem. Recall that,
by hypothesis, the reason private schools educate so successfully is that private
control avoids bureaucracy (defined as outside regulation of instruction, hiring,
and firing), which facilitates effective organization (defined as the absence of
administrative "routines and paperwork"), which facilitates learning. 103 What-
ever the Supreme Court thinks about the church-state entanglements needed to
keep public money from flowing to secular activities,"° Chubb, Moe, and
other choice proponents think those entanglements are educational anathema.
for cost of transporting parochial children to school).
In Witters, the Court upheld the payment of a state vocational-training grant for the handicapped to
a blind man attending Bible college. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489. Five concurring Justices emphasized the
constitutionality of state programs: (1) "that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class
defined without reference to religion"; (2) thatdo not"'singlef] out a [religiously identified] class of citizens
for a special economic benefit'"; and (3) under which "any aid to religion results from the private choices
of individual beneficiaries." Id. at 490-91 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832); see also
id. at 490 (White, J., concurring); id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Witters' bearing
on elementary and secondary school vouchers is uncertain. First, any widely available choice plan that, like
the program in Witters, paid money "directly to" parents for transmission to "educational institutions of
choice," id. at 487 (majority opinion), would be an administrative nightmare, rife with opportunities for
fraud. Second, the Court has traditionally subjected public funding of higher education to considerably less
Establishment Clause scrutiny than public funding of elementary and secondary education. See, e.g., Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1971). Third, the compulsory nature of elementary and secondary
education subverts the Witters requirement that "any" money citizens pay religious schools be entirely a
matter of "private decisions." Witters, 474 U.S. at 491 (Powell, I., concurring). Fourth, by relieving only
parents of private and parochial school children of the traditional lost-subsidy penalty for abandoning the
public schools, elementary and secondary school vouchers arguably "'single out a [religiously identified]
class of citizens for a special economic benefit."' Id. at 491 n.2 (quoting Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832). Finally,
the weak "inference" of state religious endorsement when the state gives vocational-training grants to a small
number of eligible handicapped adults attending religious colleges, id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
strengthens considerably when millions of children compelled to attend school divert billions of tax dollars
to parochial schools whose principal mission "is 'to assure future adherents to a particular faith."' Titon,
403 U.S. at 685-86 (quoting Waltz, 397 U.S. at 671). At that point, the program approaches the situation
the Witters Court distinguished: where no meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the student
and aid to the school. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 n.4.
102. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985); Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 375-78,382-86; id.
at 398-99 (Burger, C.J. & O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Sloan, 413
U.S. at 827, 832; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785-86, 789-90; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 611-13. In the cited passages:
Lemon forbids direct state subsidization of core parts of parochial school instruction; Nyquist and Sloan
forbid accomplishment of the same goal through mechanisms that pass the subsidy to the school via the
parent; and Lemon, Grand Rapids, and Aguilar reject attempts to sanitize subsidies by targeting them for
secular programs, particularly when the teachers conducting the programs are hired by the parochial school.
Thus, little room is left for even secularly targeted subsidies that nominally pass through the parent. See
Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 395 ("[D]irect aid to the educational function of the religious school is indistin-
guishable from the provision of a direct cash subsidy to the religious school that is ... prohibited under
the Establishment Clause.").
103. Pp. 150-55, 223-25.
104. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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In addition to trading off against each other, educational excellence and
constitutionality trade off against equity, as tax credits reveal. In the past, the
Court has upheld tax deductions for modest portions of private school expendi-
tures t05 but struck down a form of tax credit.106 Although this distinction
may be at risk in the Court's current restructuring of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, any adjustment in the law is unlikely, for equity reasons, to
permit a tax credit plan that Chubb, Moe, and like-minded choice advocates
would find attractive.
The problem with the tax credit/negative income tax scheme that the Court
actually struck down is that it was a voucher plan in disguise: It allowed a
particular class of taxpayers to receive a uniform benefit for each child the
taxpayer had enrolled in a parochial school, regardless of the taxpayer's income
and regardless of how much she actually spent on her children's education.107
One can imagine the Court upholding tax deductions for parochial tuition that
are more substantial (even 100%) than the Court yet has upheld, and even
approving tax credits that depend on parents' actual income and expenditures
on parochial schools." 8 But any such deduction or credit plan is likely to
have three unattractive characteristics. First, it probably cannot enable poor and
working class children to purchase a parochial education because the income-
and spending-insensitive features necessary to accomplish that goal would
replicate the direct-aid and quasi-voucher attributes that the Court's precedents
forbid." 9 Second, the plan would exacerbate existing educational inequities
by subsidizing families in proportion to how little they need an educational
boost, i.e., based on whether families have enough income or tax liability to
offset with a tax break. Finally, by increasing the proportion of educational
connoisseurs who can afford to give up the public subsidy by transferring to
private schools, the plan would plunder the public schools (from which the poor
could not escape) in a number of ways discussed below.110 Trading off equity
to achieve constitutionality, tax credit plans are likely to help the rich get richer,
while the poor stay poor.
Without contemplating drastic changes in Establishment Clause doctrine,
it is hard to imagine educationally attractive voucher programs or socially
attractive tax credit plans that include Catholic schools. Yet, on the basis of
105. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391 (1983).
106. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780.
107. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 393, 396-97 & n.6 (credits are unconstitutional if they are not "part[]
of a genuine system of tax laws," and provide a benefit that "'is unrelated to the amount of money actually
expended by any parent on tuition, but is calculated on the basis of a formula... to assure that each family
would receive a carefully estimated net benefit"' (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790)); Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 785-86, 789-90.
108. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400 (dicta). Mueller suggests, however, that, to be constitutional, tax
breaks tied to educational expenditures must be available to all parents and not simply to parents of children
attending private and parochial schools. See id. at 388, 397.
109. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
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existing data, it is hard to imagine a social scientifically supportable plan for
educational improvement that excludes those schools.
Even if nonsectarian tax credit and uncapped voucher plans enhance
educational excellence, they do so intolerably by trading off equity. A key
desideratum of such plans is to preserve the supplier's market freedom to
decide how much to charge for a particular service and the consumer's market
freedom to decide how much to spend on it. Thus, although educationally and
politically viable plans probably would have to provide all students with a
benefit sufficient to purchase a minimally adequate education,' such plans,
by assumption, would not restrict private school tuitions to that benefit or to
any other amount.
The consequence of such plans would be the segregation of schools, like
other consumer markets, on the basis of class. If we assume only that the
market works-educational consumers get what they pay for-and that wealthy
families can and will pay for more on average than less wealthy families, we
can be sure that uncapped plans will distribute learning, beyond some "mini-
mally adequate" amount, on the basis of wealth. At that point, liberal demo-
cracy's basic premise of equal educational opportunity is threatened. 12 Simi-
larly, the four-decade-old premise of racial equality and integration is threat-
ened, given (as the authors demonstrate) that racial stratification follows class
stratification." 3
In response to class segregation worries, choice advocates often claim that
parents will choose on the basis of tastes, not cost.114 Just as wealthy diners-
out, who can afford to sup at Le Cirque, may prefer the nice little bistro around
the corner, so, too, wealthy parents may choose a school because they prefer
"open education" to a more regimented approach or courses in science to ones
in fine arts. Choice advocates also point out that, given private and suburban
options, schools already are stratified by class." 5
There is reason to fear, however, that uncapped voucher and tax credit
plans will make today's socially stratified situation worse. To begin with, even
accounting for taste, the range of restaurants accessible to wealthy customers
is far broader than that available to the working class and the working and
unemployed poor-even were the latter granted restaurant-redeemable food
stamps. Moreover, everything else being equal, the more a restaurant's patrons
are expected to pay for their dinner, the better they can expect it to be.
11. To enable poor and working class children to escape the public schools, plans would have to
provide those children with the entire "minimally adequate" amount. To make the cost of doing so palatable
to a majority of voters, the same benefit almost certainly would have to extend to middle class children as
well.
112. See Liebman, supra note 61, at 367-70.
113. Pp. 119, 127.
114. See pp. 32-33, 55; James S. Coleman, Choice, Community and Future Schools, in 1 CHOICE AND
CONTROL, supra note 36, at xix, xviii.
115. See John E. Coons, As Arrows in the Hand, in I CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 319,
320-21.
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Second, although well-off patrons may select restaurants on the basis of
the patrons' short and long term wealth, restaurants need not select customers
on any basis other than the customers' momentarily available (and perhaps
visible) wealth. The same is not true of private schools, which have a strong
incentive to select students on the basis of their long-term as well as their
momentary wealth.1 16 A school's competitive position depends on its educa-
tional performance; its educational performance depends on its students'
academic success; its students' academic success depends principally on their
parents' and their peers' parents' socioeconomic status; and socioeconomic
status depends not only on momentary circumstances (family income) but on
long-term traits as well (parents' prior educational attainments). 7 Market-
wise private school operators are accordingly well advised (using available
proxies, such as intelligence and achievement tests, alumni preferences, tuition
scales, location, residential restrictions, and the like) to allocate seats on the
basis of long-term and existing net worth.
Finally, uncapped plans dispense with the stiff penalty currently imposed
on parents who segregate their children socially. Assume that the average public
school system annually spends $4,000 on the education of each child.118 As-
sume further that, despite bureaucratic inefficiency, half that amount, $2,000,
finds its way to the child. Under the current system, the rational parent choos-
ing between public schools and even perfectly efficient private schools faces
the following situation: Whether she has nothing, $500, $1,000 or $1,900 to
spend on each child's education, she (rationally) must send her children to
public school-along with all other children whose parents have less than
$2,000 to spend, and, we can predict, along with a number of children whose
parents have even more than $2,000 to spend. True, a parent with $2,500 to
spend on education has the option of sending her child to a private school. But
in doing so, she will purchase only $500 more in education at a cost of
$2,500-giving her a return of 20 cents on the dollar. Assuming that she can
get up to 100 cents on the dollar for other uses of her money, she will think
long and hard before spending the money on education. Accordingly, one can
expect parents with less than lavish tastes for education to send their children
to (even urban) public schools, although they have $2,500, or $5,000 (returning
60 cents on the dollar), or even $8,000 dollars (returning 75 cents on the dollar)
to spend on each child's education.119
116. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (private schools have incentive to select students
on basis of parents' and students' educational tastes); supra note 40 and accompanying text (educational
tastes are partially tied to wealth).
117. Pp. 110-11; see supra note 22.
118. The figure actually is a little more than $5,600. See K-12 Spending Rises by 7.2 Percent to Record
$231 Billion for 1990-91, EDUC. WK., Sept. 5, 1990, at 2.
119. Although the lost-subsidy penalty for moving to the suburbs is smaller than that for enrolling in
private school, a penalty still exists, hence a similar analysis applies to suburbanward moves. See supra
notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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The situation is quite different under an uncapped voucher or tax credit
plan. Once the state closes the public schools and turns over $2,000 to each
child's parent, then the children of parents with nothing to spend on education
can be expected to attend school-call it Soup Kitchen High-with each other
and no one else. Children whose parents have $500 to spend will congregate
in a slightly better school-call it McDonald's High. n1 0 And children whose
parents have each additional increment to spend will congregate, by class, in
a smorgasbord of schools ranging from Hardee's and Howard Johnson's High
to Sardi's and Smith and Wollensky High. 2'
By my lights, the equity cost just described is too much to pay, even for
modest across-the-board gains in educational excellence. By other lights, the
cost is worth incurring on the assumption that showering the rich is a good idea
as long as everybody else gets more in the way of runoff than any of them was
getting before.'22 The kicker is that the result of an uncapped voucher or
credit plan might not be across-the-board educational improvement but, instead,
drastic below-the-median decline.
Recall that educational tastes have a large impact on educational achieve-
ment. Recall also that the tastes that count are not simply those of one's parents
but also those of one's classmates and their parents. Consider, finally, that
educational tastes are strongly, although by no means perfectly, correlated to
wealth."z By trading in existing schools, which mix children of all socioeco-
nomic and motivational statuses except those that prompt parents to spend a
dollar to purchase a lot less than 100 cents worth of education, for schools that
mix only children of nearly identical socioeconomic statuses, uncapped plans
assure that all poor children will be victimized not only by their parents' own
educationally disadvantaged situations, but also by the unfortunate circumstanc-
es of literally every one of their peers. 24
An illustration is close at hand. Consider the existing market for post-
secondary education--bracketing tuition-capped public universities, and keeping
in mind both the Pell grants that give most high school graduates access to
120. See Mark Walsh, Entrepreneur Whittle Unveils Plans to Create Chain of For-Profit Schools,
EDUC. WK., May 22, 1991, at 1.
121. As long as it remains uncapped, any politically and fiscally viable plan can only superficially
moderate stratification by giving higher benefits to the poor. See supra note 111.
122. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-78 (1971) ("difference principle" permits less
equitable distributions of wealth that improve position of all citizens). This argument against consumer
stratification does not extend to markets for goods and services that do not serve the social reproduction
goals discussed earlier. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1635-45; supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
In my view, the limited social reproduction function of higher education places it in a middle position, in
which stratification is allowable but ought to be tempered by liberal public subsidies and race- and class-
specific affirmative action and scholarship policies. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
123. See sources cited supra notes 38-40.
124. The stratification process reaches its regrettable zenith when, having first divided children along
race and class lines, it then divides the resulting groups along political, motivational, and gender lines. See
NOW Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Public Education Programs for African American Males: A
Women's Educational Equity Policy Perspective (1991) (on file with author).
[V/ol. 101: 259
Voice, Not Choice
some kind of post-high school education and the other partial public subsidies
available to most American post-secondary institutions. Even given the breadth
of public subsidization and the prevalence of affirmative action programs,
consider whose children, by and large, take advantage of the public subsidies
given to Stanford, Smith, and Swarthmore, and whose children, by and large,
spend their Pell vouchers on the proprietary beautician, bank teller, and "busi-
ness" schools that advertise in the subway-and consider, most particularly,
how tragically little the latter students get for their, your, and my money.115
C. Just So Free and a Little Less: Capped Vouchers and Ability Segregation
The authors seek to avoid the concededly unacceptable costs of uncapped
plans by sacrificing one of the three market freedoms outlined earlier.1"
Under the authors' plan, states would entice entrants into a "new system of
public education" by offering them access to a large pool of legally compelled,
publicly subsidized, and choice-invested consumers. 27 The price of admission
to the market-or perhaps a further inducement to enter-would be a near
prohibition on price competition among participating schools."t s Thus, al-
though parents would retain the freedom to choose schools (with state funding
triggered by those choices) and schools would retain the freedom to decide
which customers to serve, parents would lose the market freedom to pay (and
schools generally would give up the market freedom to charge) what they
please for an education.
125. See Jason DeParle, In Ruling, Hope for Students Deceived by Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991,
at All; Karen De Witt, U.S. Threatening to End Aid at 225 Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1991, at A18;
New York Interface Development Project Inc., Unfair at Any Price: Welfare Recipients at New York
Proprietary Schools (1989) (on file with author); U.S. Federal Trade Comm'n Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Proprietary Vocational and Home Study Schools (1976). Equally cautionary are the nation's
experiences with market-driven mechanisms for delivering: (1) health care to the poor under the Medicaid
program-to which much inefficiency, professional stagnation, and underservicing of needs has been
attributed, see Paul Starr, Health Care for the Poor: The Past Twenty Years, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT
WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 106, 106-32 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986); (2)
housing to the poor under HUD's section 8 housing voucher program-to which endemic, publicly
subsidized racial segregation has been attributed, see James W. Fossett & Gary Orfield, Market Failure and
Federal Policy: Low-Income Housing in Chicago 1970-83, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING
PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 158, 158-80 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987) (Urban Affairs Ann. Rev., Vol.
32); and (3) workers compensation benefits to injured industrial employees-to which abandonment of public
welfare policies in favor of rigid enforcement of narrow private rights has been attributed, see PHILIPPE
NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY 167-74, 260-65
(1969).
126. Pp. 206,217-18, 220; see Chubb & Hanushek, supra note 6, at 238-39; supra text accompanying
notes 94-95.
127. Pp. 186, 206, 217-18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
128. Pp. 219-21. The authors' plan achieves this outcome by forbidding parents to pay more than the
state-determined voucher amount and by giving schools and parents no incentive to charge and pay less
than that amount. Although public school districts could use local tax receipts to supplement the state
scholarship, p. 220, the ability of children to spend these "collective add-ons" in other districts will
discourage local taxpayers from approving them.
1991]
The Yale Law Journal
This move costs the authors dearly in exit-driven, autonomy-promoting,
organization-improving discipline. For the authors' plan assures educational
suppliers not only that no alternative good, service, or opportunity (including
staying at home) can entice their customers to exit, but also that no competing
supplier of the same service will entice away clients by lowering its price for
the same service or by raising its price and providing a better service. All
suppliers need fear is that a competitor will find a way to provide a better
product at the same price. If this does not sound like a bad idea, consider that
it presents a less competitive situation than that bugaboo of the Chicago
set-the pre-deregulation airline industry-which at least always faced competi-
tion from the train, bus, car, and stay-at-home industries, even though member
firms did not price compete with each other.
Having relieved parents of their right to price shop, the authors then relieve
suppliers of their constitutional right to privacy. By becoming state actors,
schools subject themselves to the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the various statutory burdens of actors on the left side of the public-private
divide. 129 Most importantly, participating schools trade in their First Amend-
ment right to religious free exercise for a First Amendment responsibility of
religious disestablishment. Hope as the authors do for parochial school partici-
pation, 130 they offer no reason to think that even a future Supreme Court
would let the Catholic Church run public schools. As was true of uncapped
plans, therefore, the authors' capped plan inevitably must exclude the only
segment of private schools that even choice-oriented social scientists can agree
provides better-than-ordinary schooling.'31
With the schools' privacy goes most of their independence-what the
authors call "autonomy" and loath giving up. 132 For example, policing the
antidiscrimination norms that the authors favor and the Constitution imposes
will necessitate administrative and judicial scrutiny-what the authors call
"bureaucracy" and loath giving in to. 133 Additional bureaucracy will accompa-
ny enforcement of the due process and free speech restrictions that schools'
inclusion in a public system dictates."3 More also will accompany the audit-
ing procedures that taxpayers presumably will demand in return for the billions
they are assessed. 35
129. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1550-52 & nn.390, 392 & 394.
130. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The point stands even if the "public" appellation is
withheld. However denominated, a Catholic school for which the state is the only source of funding almost
assuredly violates the Establishment Clause. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 11-13, 19-21 and accompanying text.
133. P. 221; see Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
'(1954); supra notes 11-13, 19-21 and accompanying text.
134. Cf. p. 54 (listing due process protections among bureaucratic defalcations most assiduously to
be avoided).
135. Cf. pp.28-30 (criticizing public control for making parents share power with taxpayers). Taxpayers
and voters may demand more than auditing procedures. See Kinkaid & Meyer, supra note 84 (proposed
ceiling on state regulation of private schools recently led Oregon voters to defeat school-choice initiative
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The list goes on. The authors' plan would require state officials to: "setf
criteria that define what constitutes a 'public school' under the new system
[including] ... graduation .... health and safety .... and teacher certification
requirements"; develop a schedule of voucher (i.e., price control) levels based
on "special educational needs. . . arising from economic deprivation, physical
handicaps, language difficulties, emotional problems, and other disadvantages";
adjudicate claims that students received the wrong voucher amount; create "a
Choice Office in each district which, among other things, will maintain a record
of all school-age children and the level of funding ... associated with each
child"; provide a "Parent Information Center" in each district charged with
collecting and making available to the public information on the schools'
"mission, their staff and course offerings, parent and student satisfaction, staff
opinions, standardized test scores .... and anything else that would promote
informed choice among parents and students"; distribute, help parents fill out,
and collect applications to individual schools; design a "safety-net procedure
. . . to ensure that [a child] is assigned to a. .. school" when no school
voluntarily accepts her; adjudicate claims that suspensions are "'arbitrary and
capricious' "; police claims that parents are overtly or covertly paying more than
the voucher amount; "operate a system of buses for getting students to drop-off
points . .. where schools... would then pick them up," "reimburs[e] schools
on a per child basis" for transporting students, and license and regulate the bus
companies providing the complex transportation services that the authors' open-
enrollment feature would entail; approve "applications for new schools";
"monitor schools for adherence to law"; and negotiate with the unions to which
public systems are "conducive."' 36 In the face of the complex regulatory
structure required by Chubb and Moe's proposal, the authors exhibit a certain
amount of imagination when they describe the schools they advocate as "con-
trolled only by the market ... [and] free to organize any way the [schools]
want."137
By giving up price competition, jettisoning Catholic schools, and subjecting
new entrants to several shelf-feet of regulations, the authors leave few of their
market and achievement-promoting principles intact. Most disturbing, they
achieve little equity for their trouble. As the airline example illustrates, dispens-
ing with price competition exaggerates quality competition. Yet, when com-
similar to Chubb and Moe's plan; in response, drafters of new initiative added controls on private school
admissions, tuition, curriculum, testing, and even religious practices).
136. Pp. 188, 219-26. 309 n.53; cf. pp. 194-96, 287 n.21 (ruing bureaucratic control over graduation
requirements, teacher certification, and bus driver training); pp. 53-55 (attacking bureaucratic regulations
associated with "socialization of immigrants," "mainstreaming of the handicapped," and "bilingual
education"); pp. 39, 309 n.51 (opposing states' "control [of] schools from above"); Chubb & Hanushek,
supra note 6, at 240 ("Obviously, the more government regulation, the further the plan deviates from the
concept of an educational market.").
137. P. 190.
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bined with the schools' surviving freedom to set their own admissions crite-
ria, 38 quality competition is sure to stratify schools on the basis of student
ability, if not family wealth.
Absent price competition, schools will compete on the basis of the quality
of their results. Average SAT scores will replace price as the lingua franca of
value. As the authors document, the best way to increase test scores when price
controls hamper selectivity on the basis of wealth is not to give principals a
lot of autonomy or to improve the effectiveness of the school's organization
but to admit smarter students.'3 9 Accordingly, as long as participating schools
retain the second market freedom-to use I.Q. or achievement tests to control
admissions-we can expect capped voucher plans to generate the same
McDonald's High to Le Cirque High stratification as that generated by un-
capped voucher plans."4 The only difference, as the airline example again
reminds us, is that stratifying customers using quality and ability may cost more
than tried-and-true stratification on the basis of price and wealth. In any event,
as detailed above, with stratification comes not only the death of equity but also
a dearth of excellence, at least for the children at Soup Kitchen, McDonald's,
and Hardee's High.'4 '
Having attempted to exchange a decrement in market freedom, and thus
(by hypothesis) of excellence, for an increment of equity, the authors' plan in
fact achieves neither equity, market freedom, nor excellence.
D. Just So Free and a Lot Less: Open Enrollment, Controlled Choice, and
Racial Segregation
What's left in the way of choice? The answer given by the Minnesota and
Nebraska Legislatures, many urban public high school systems, and several
school districts in Massachusetts is open-enrollment or, in Massachusetts
parlance, "controlled choice."' 42 Under this approach, a good bit more equity
arises, as the second to last market freedom falls. Within some geographic
boundary-a school district's, a metropolitan area's, or a state's-parents retain
138. Pp. 221-22 ("[It] is absolutely crucial" that schools "be free to admit as many or as few students
as they want, based on whatever criteria they think relevant-intelligence, interest, motivation, behavior,
special needs .... ").
139. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
140. The authors thus would implement a comprehensive scheme of school-by-school ability-grouping
to replace the intermittent classroom-by-classroom tracking that goes on today. On the damage that tracking
does to poor and minority students (with little gain to wealthier and white students), see JEANNIE OAKES,
KEEPING TRACK (1985).
141. See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
142. Pp. 210-11, 307 n.39; see Dennis Baack & Keith Geiger, Should Students Be Allowed to Choose
Their School?, STATE GOV'T NEWS, Feb. 1991, at 10-11; William Snider, 'Choice' Proposals Make
Headway in Statehouses in 1990, EDUC. WK., Sept. 5, 1990, at 26; Michael Marriott, States That Allow a
Choice of Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1990, at B7.
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the freedom to choose public schools, but schools give up the freedom to
choose students.14 3
The authors criticize open-enrollment plans on excellence grounds, arguing
that such plans retain too much bureaucracy and too little market freedom. 14
The open-enrollment experience of New York City's high schools adds an
equity objection-stratification on the basis of consumer sophistication. 145
Confirming the results of investigations conducted elsewhere, a recent study
concludes that poor and minority families in New York City have continued
sending their children to the nearest school at hand, often unaware that alterna-
tives are available. Meanwhile, middle class and white families have used the
open-enrollment program to aggregate their children in superior programs both
inside and outside their own neighborhoods.1 46 Freedom-of-choice plans also
can facilitate racial segregation. 47
The Massachusetts "controlled choice" plans are an important exception
to the stratification history of open-enrollment programs. Devised to sell racial
desegregation to patrons of districts in which real integration remains possible,
these plans have achieved considerable equity and academic success by signifi-
cantly constraining the last remaining market freedom-that of parents to
choose schools. t 4 The success of these plans thus has depended on top-down
edicts from a state-level agency requiring districts to make racial desegregation
143. The Minnesota and Nebraska plans allow any child to attend any school with space in the State.
Public funds follow the student. P. 210. A limitation on the Minnesota plan is the lack of transportation
aid for poor families. See Joseph Nathan, More Public Choice Can Mean More Learning, EDUC. LEADER-
SHIP, Oct. 1989, at 51-55; William Snider, Minnesota Backs Nation's First Choice System, EDUC. WK., May
4, 1988, at 1. Less than one-half of 1% of the eligible children (most of them rural children) have participat-
ed. See Kenneth J. Cooper, Minnesotas Choice Option Inspires Few Students to Transfer, WASH. POST,
Feb. 24, 1991, at A12.
144. Pp. 210, 212.
145. See generally Chubb & Hanushek, supra note 6, at 232 ("Parents who are well educated or deeply
committed to education are likely to make better choices than other families do."); Janet A. Weiss, Control
in School Organizations: Theoretical Perspectives, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 91, 114-15.
146. Columbia Law School Education Law Project, Promoting Integration in the New York City High
Schools 20-23 (1937) (on file with author); see Richard F. Elmore, Choice as an Instrument of Public
Policy: Evidence from Education and Health Care, in I CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 285, 301,
313 (same conclusion based on studies of pilot educational-choice program that Nixon Administration
conducted in San Jose); Donald R. Moore, Voice and Choice in Chicago, in 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra
note 36, at 153, 178-91, 194-95 (discussing DONALD R. MOORE & SUZANNE DAVENPORT, THE NEW
IMPROVED SORTING MACHINE, FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CENTER ON EFFECTIVE SECONDARY
SCHOOLS, MADISON, WISCONSIN (1988)) (same conclusion based on study of high school open-enrollment
plans in Boston, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia). The absence of price competition and objective
measures of instructional quality exacerbates informational difficulties. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at
26-28; supra note 61 and accompanying text. Although disempowered groups can overcome informational
and bargaining disadvantages by organizing and then delegating enforcement of their rights to experts
employed by the collective, making them do so promotes bureaucratization and interest-group conflict of
the sort the authors abhor. See NONET, supra note 125, at 51-57, 70-120.
147. See Baack & Geiger, supra note 142, at II (evidence that white students have used Minnesota's
plan to transfer from integrated urban to all-white suburban schools). See generally Green v. County Sch.
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (freedom-of-choice desegregation plans unconstitutionally preserve segregated
conditions).
148. See pp. 210-11; Michael J. Alves& Charles V. Willie, Choice, Decentralization, and Desegrega-
tion: The Boston 'Controlled Choice' Plan, in 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 17-76.
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a prerequisite for permissible parental choice and mandating close monitoring
and supervision to ensure that parents make informed decisions. 14 9 As dis-
cussed later, the Massachusetts success story suggests that half a market
freedom is better than three, and that "controlled" uses of exit help, not as
infusions of choice but as catalysts of voice." 0
E. Summary
Education is a public good that cannot be allocated on a free market basis.
Every market-based aspect of every educational arrangement we have examined
supports this conclusion and begs a stronger one: Market mechanisms interfere
with the capacity of society to reproduce itself through elementary and second-
ary schools. Thus, if consumers are allowed to choose whether to purchase an
education, many will refuse, and social competence and cohesion will decline.
If consumers instead are compelled to purchase an education but are left to their
own economic devices to do so, many will be unable to comply, and decline
still will occur. If consumers instead are compelled to purchase an education
and are given the minimum resources needed to do so, but are not limited in
their expenditures, they will arrange themselves on the basis of wealth, with
children in the bottom tier of schools receiving a counterfeit education that is
worse even than the one they receive today, and decline will persist. If consum-
ers instead are compelled to purchase an education, are given the minimum
resources needed to do so, and are held to a maximum expenditure, schools free
to select students will arrange children on the basis of ability, and the same
bottom tier will offer the same counterfeit education with the same negative
results. If consumers instead are compelled to purchase an education, are given
the minimum resources needed to do so, are held to a maximum expenditure,
and (space permitting) are assured entry into whatever school they choose, then
we no longer have a market. Yet schools still will stratify on the basis of race
and consumer sophistication (i.e., class), and social reproduction still will be
at more risk than it is today. Indeed, even if only educational connoisseurs are
free, as is now true, to purchase the suburban or private education of their
choice, the effect on urban districts is the disaster the authors describe.
Have we not, then, dismissed all the options running from a truly free and
decentralized market for education to the existing interest-group and bureaucra-
cy ridden system? Have we not, then, come to the point of capitulation to a
149. See Charles L. Glenn, Parent Choice: A State Perspective, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra
note 36, at 327, 329 ("We know how to deal effectively with the equity issues, though at a considerable
cost to anyone's theories of pure market mechanisms" and via substantial "state regulation and state
incentives."); Thernstrom, supra note 4, at 130 (noting "coercive nature of the assignment process under
controlled choice" in Massachusetts).
150. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
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situation that all consider corrupt? Answering these questions requires us to
return to where the authors' study left us earlier.
III. WHY DON'T JANE'S AND JOHNNY'S PARENTS SPEAK UP;
WHY AREN'T THEY HEARD?
A. Statistical Speculations
Why don't Johnny and Jane learn? The clearest answer to this question is
that Johnny's and Jane's parents do not have enough income and education.151
If the state increased those resources, Jane's and Johnny's academic accom-
plishments also would increase. As clear as this message of Chubb and Moe's
book is, it is not a message the authors' New Paradigm disciples can hear.'52
Before giving up on pie in the sky, however, consider this: a fourth to a third
of the effect of socioeconomic status comes not from the wealth and education-
al attainments of Jane's and Johnny's own parents but from the wealth and
attainments of their classmates' parents. Even if it is hopeless pie in the sky
to make Johnny and Jane richer, is it quite so hopeless to place Johnny and
Jane in schools with kids who already are richer? Whatever the answer, recall
that, by starting up "New, More Efficient 'Sorting Machine[s],' choice propos-
als accomplish just the opposite.'53
The next clearest answer to the question "Why don't Jane and Johnny
learn?" is that Jane and Johnny do not have sufficient intellectual resources.'14
Although a proposal to make Johnny and Jane smarter may seem no less
facetious than one to make them richer, consider that the authors use prior
achievement (sophomore test scores) to measure ability, and that at least one
condition short of redistribution--enrollment in academic programs-is associ-
ated with prior achievement. 55 Even accepting, as suggested above, that
academic program is merely a proxy for educational tastes,'56 this line of
analysis suggests that policymakers could enhance Jane's and Johnny's learning
by convincing Jane, Johnny, and their parents to place a higher priority on
education. Moreover, the research on school desegregation suggests that this
last formulation is not facetious.
As I have discussed elsewhere, there is reason to think that, done early and
right, desegregation improves the achievement of African American chil-
151. See supra notes 9, 22, 117 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 5.
153. See William Snider, School Choice: New, More Efficient 'Sorting Machine'?, EDUC. WK., May
18, 1988, at I (quoting MOORE & DAVENPORT, supra note 146, at 1); supra notes 111-25, 138-41, 145-47
and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 22.
155. See id.; supra notes 43, 50 and accompanying text supra note 74.
156. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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dren.157 It may be, moreover, that the proposition that desegregation improves
achievement, like the proposition that private school attendance improves
achievement, simply illustrates two successively more general proposi-
tions-that enrollment in an academic program improves achievement and that
giving priority to receiving academic training improves the likelihood that the
students will succeed academically.158 Just as integrating poor children into
schools with significant populations of wealthy children may give poor children
the benefit of the rich children's resources-including the rich children's taste
for academic education-so, too, racial integration may have a similar effect,
even controlling for socioeconomic status. 5 9 This final speculation is not, of
course, just that. Rather, it recapitulates a conclusion that desegregation re-
searchers have long espoused and have recently begun to document."6°
We now have the beginnings of a school improvement policy-or, rather,
the extension of a policy the Supreme Court began forty years ago. Thus,
instead of choice plans' new and more efficient sorting machines, what policy-
makers ought to be installing are new and more efficient racial, class, and
motivational combines. Indeed, reconsideration of the critical regression in the
authors' book reveals that the two best proxies for the policy advocated
here-school socioeconomic status and academic program-have a bigger effect
on achievement than making children richer and nearly 80% of the effect of
making them smarter.16
B. Theoretical Speculations
1. Educational Theory
Do principals, teachers, and academic programs matter? Or, do schools
work or not work according to nothing more than how they sort or combine
students? Schools do matter, I think. They have good or bad effects based not
only on which students and parents they combine or sort, but also on how
effectively particular combinations or classes of students and parents make
schools work. The mechanism for improvement or stagnation, however, is not
choice but voice.
How is it, then, that Johnny and Jane get the benefit of their classmates'
and their classmates' parents' tastes for education? In addition to peer pressure
and parental role modeling, the education literature suggests that a critical mass
157. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1624-26.
158. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. This speculation explains the authors' "controver-
sial" finding that racial integration, although "clearly" associated with achievement before controlling for
"effective organization" (which includes "academic program"), is not linked to achievement after controlling
for academic program. Pp. 119, 127.
159. See Bryk et al., supra note 39, at 148-51.
160. Seep. 297 nn.18 & 19 (citing some of the literature); Liebman, supra note 42, at 1624-25 n.675.
161. Pp. 132-33 tbl. 4-10.
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of parents with strong educational aspirations for their children causes teachers
to exhibit the same aspirations in the classroom. And when teachers do so-and
when they satisfy those aspirations by providing the aspired-after academic
courses-then all children the teachers instruct, and not simply the children of
the parents who spoke up, derive the important educational benefit of those
expectations.162 Under the right circumstances, that is, Jane and Johnny take
academic courses because everybody else is taking those courses, because the
parent-driven ethic of the school is to want, and to want others, to take those
courses, and, eventually, it is hoped, because Johnny and Jane want to take
those courses. Having enrolled in academic programs, moreover, Johnny and
Jane are likely to perform more successfully on academic tests than they would
have performed had they remained in their former schools suffused with their,
or their peers', or their teachers' former indifference to the academic enterprise.
2. Economic Theory
So much for the educational theory of the matter. Consider the supporting
economic theory. Albert 0. Hirschman told the tale twenty years ago, but it
bears repeating.163
Consumers can make firms do their bidding in two ways: They can exit
or they can complain." If dissatisfied consumers exit, they can cause firms,
fearing the depletion of their market, to change their behavior in order to
increase consumer satisfaction. If dissatisfied consumers complain, they can
cause firms, seeking ways to improve their product or pacify unhappy custom-
ers, to take similar steps.
If consumers have alternatives, those most likely to exit when the quality
of a product diminishes are "connoisseurs"--consumers who get the highest
degree of return for each increment of quality.165 Connoisseurs are particularly
likely to exit because the relatively higher satisfaction they get from a better
product makes them especially willing to spend time shopping for it and to pay
more when they find it. Likewise, connoisseurs are the consumers most likely
to complain when quality diminishes and they do not have alternatives. 66 The
reason is similar. When quality wanes, connoisseurs lose more than other
customers, hence have more to complain about when a substitute is unavailable.
Quality declines are least likely to be arrested when connoisseurs can afford
to exit but the remaining customers cannot.1 67 In this situation, the firm
benefits from the discipline of neither exit (because the loss of connoisseurs
162. See pp. 92-95; authority cited in Liebman, supra note 42, at 1615 n.644, 1624-25 n.675.
Intraschool tracking spoils the effect. See supra note 140; infra note 264.
163. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17.
164. Id. at 4, 15-16.
165. See id. at 46-50.
166. See id. at 49.
167. See id. at 44-46.
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does not deprive the firm of a market for its goods) nor voice (because the most
vocal complainers have left). This, Professor Hirschman points out, is the
situation of the urban public schools.'68 As quality declines, educational
connoisseurs move to the suburbs or to private schools where they can get the
high quality product they desire, albeit at higher tax or tuition cost. These shifts
to competitors do not trouble the public schools much because those schools
retain a guaranteed pool of consumers-all those families that are legally
required to send their children to school and financially unable to move to the
suburbs or the private market, and all those taxpayers required to pay for those
children to go to school. Free of the discipline of exit, public schools also are
rid of a good bit of the constraint of voice, because the people who care most
about education have left.169
Quality declines are most likely to be arrested when connoisseurs cannot
exit. 7 ' In the absence of an exit option, declines in quality cause the most
sophisticated consumers to complain and to tell the producer how to improve
the product. This, Professor Hirschman points out, is the situation not only of
conservative connoisseurs of Republican Party politics in 1964 (and liberal
connoisseurs of Democratic politics since 1972) but also of patrons of private
and suburban public schools.' 7 ' Having fled the urban public schools for high-
cost private schools or high-tax suburban districts, and having nowhere else to
go (quality being what it is elsewhere), the dissatisfied consumer of private and
suburban education has no choice but to stand and fight. As a result, "deteriora-
tion will be more strenuously fought 'from within' in the case of the private
than in that of the public schools."'172
The consequence of this process for the public schools is an exit-ignoring,
voice-avoiding triple whammy. First, if quality declines, the public schools
"lose the children of those highly quality-conscious parents who might other-
wise have fought deterioration. Second, if quality thereafter declines in the
private schools, then quality-conscious parents will keep their children there
for much longer than was the case when the public schools deteriorated."'173
Third, "because exit is not a particularly powerful recuperation mechanism in
the case of public schools ... the failure of one of our two mechanisms [voice]
is here compounded by the inefficiency of the other [exit]."' 74
168. See id. at 44-52.
169. See id. at 33-34, 45-46.
170. See id. at 55. This sounds a lot like monopoly, which it is. But, as the existence of the successfully
functioning monopolies we call families, churches, political parties, and polities makes clear, when voice
is both assured and effective, the result need not be indolence and mediocrity. See id. at 33, 56-61; infra
notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
171. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at 50-52, 68-72.
172. Id. at 52.
173. Id. at 51-52.
174. Id. at 52. Thus, the "wholesome" competition that private schools sometimes are said to provide
public schools, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), is better characterized as "noxious." HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at 45.
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The same connoisseur flight characterizes residential moves to the sub-
urbs."75 Once urban out-migrants reach the suburbs, their exit options are
reduced to whatever private school possibilities remain within financial reach,
leaving voice as a primary reliance. To the extent that suburban schools come
in academically ahead of the urban public schools but behind private schools,
the reason, a la Hirschman and contrary to Chubb and Moe, is the suburban
schools' intermediate ability to avoid pathologically disciplining choice and take
advantage of beneficially critical voice.176
Hirschman's image of the private and suburban school consumer seems
more realistic than Chubb and Moe's. The latters' claims notwithstanding, we
don't imagine dissatisfied parents, having tried Exeter one year, trying Choate
the next, and The Dalton School the next.1 77 Rather, with Hirschman, we
imagine disgruntled private and suburban consumers speaking to teachers,
mobilizing the PTA, lobbying the headmistress, or taking control of the board.
This image is especially apt for parochial school "customers." Even if other
educational consumers regularly shop for schools, the parochial school consum-
er is unlikely, having tried St. Thomas Aquinas this year, to try St. Albans next
year, and the Yeshiva the next. Rather, churches and their schools are archetyp-
al Hirschmanic organizations from which members cannot in good communi-
tarian conscience exit. Consequently, those members are especially prone to
voice. Indeed, the authors' best (some would say their only) examples of
successful private schools-Catholic institutions 178 -also best exemplify the
power of voice, given the five barriers to exit and catalysts of voice that
combine in Catholic schools: (1) religious loyalty (the absence of religiously
viable alternatives); 179 (2) a relatively high quality education compared to the
urban public schools (the absence of educationally viable alternatives at less
cost); (3) a church subsidy (the absence of financially accessible competitors,
given the relatively higher cost of nonsectarian private education);180 (4) a
geographic (parish) approach to school assignments (the discouragement of
alternative assignments within the same system);' and (5) inflexible adher-
ence to the "common school" ideal requiring all children in the same school
to enroll in the same program (the absence of alternative tracks within the same
school).182 Indeed, Catholic schools are so immunized from exit that Chubb
175. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at 51.
176. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 79.
178. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
179. See JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HIGH SCHOOLS: THE IMPACT
OF COMMUNITIES (1987); Bryk et al., supra note 39, at 135, 191; James W. Guthrie & Ami Zusman,
Unasked Questions, 51 HARV. EDUC. REV. 515, 516 (1981).
180. See Weiss, supra note 145, at 111.
181. See Elmore, supra note 146, at 315 n.5.
182. See Bryk et al., supra note 39, at 135, 176-78; Witte, supra note 23, at 15-16. There is a certain
amount of irony in the authors' inclusion of the Catholic Church among the "radically decentralized"
organizations that let "the people who run each school decide what they will teach, how they will teach
it, who will do the teaching, how much to charge for their services, and virtually everything else." Pp. 27,
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and Moe's best example of well-functioning private schools confounds their
exit-dependent thesis.
As we began to discern in Part II, upon examining various proposals to
inject choice into the public-good world of elementary and secondary education:
voice works, choice won't. Hirschman explains why. Imperfect markets become
pathological when connoisseurs are free to exit but less "voicy" consumers are
trapped. Moreover, short of giving up such public-good features as compulsory
consumption by some and mandatory purchase by others, more choice will only
mean more pathology. By withdrawing the lost-subsidy penalty and actually
funding exit, most choice proposals promise to make the schools of poor and
minority children the very epitome (rather than just an example) of pathology.
For those schools would have only-and not, as now, merely high proportions
of-parents and students lacking the resources, the ability, the desire, and the
political clout to improve their schools or go elsewhere. If the plight of urban
children looks bad now, then heaven protect them from what any choice-driven
future holds in store.
C. A Counterproposal
As its subtitle states, Hirschman's book is about "Responses to Decline in
... Organizations," including the public schools. What his analysis omits is
an explanation of why the public schools went into decline in the early
1970's.13 Passing the usual explanations for urban educational decline-racial
conflict, urban blight, the drug culture8----let me propose a simpler reason.
Towards the end of the 1960's, the baby boom went bust. As a result, the older
and less fertile constituencies whose approval was needed to increase property
tax rates as educational costs inflated simply stopped saying yes."' Being less
well funded, school systems declined.
The baby bust not only may have triggered exit-impelling urban decline,
but also may have affected the direction of exit by causing movement to places
where families with children could mitigate the political effects of the baby bust
by huddling with other families with children. Parents, that is, may have used
the process of suburbanization, as well as the option of private schools, as a
way to decrease the political costs of financing their children's education by
29.
183. See Peterson, supra note 80, at 69 ("The turning point in [public] education seems to have come
around 1970.").
184. See John F. Witte, Introduction to I CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 30.
185. See Weiss, supra note 145, at 111; see also VI-B Joint Appendix in Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d
1295, (8th Cir. 1988), af'd, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990), at 1334, 1339 (between 1964 and 1969, voters approved
half of Kansas City school district's proposals to increase levy rate: between 1970 and 1986, voters defeated
all nine proposals to increase rate).
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congregating in scattered child-rich islands in the midst of a baby-busted sea."86
All told, there are three voice, not choice, activated reasons why parents
of private and suburban school students may secure better schools for their
children than parents of urban public school students. First, paraphrasing Erik
Erikson, the former parents are unable actively to flee to another sector of
schools, leaving them no choice but actively-and vocally-to stay put. 7
Second, because they have especially strong educational motivations, private
and suburban school parents have more to say, and say it louder, when educa-
tional decline threatens. Third, when incipient decline causes private and
suburban school parents to speak, the resulting chorus of calls for change
achieves more unison and volume than urban parents can muster, because
private and suburban parents form a larger proportion of the political constitu-
ency than urban parents do.
The way to better schools lies via voice, not choice-via the more success-
ful mobilization of existing parental and student tastes for education on behalf
of all children. Increased parental voice requires two reforms: First, as a catalyst
to greater voice, exit options for educational connoisseurs and others should
be reduced. Second, to assure that parental voices are heard, the proportion of
political power over the schools entrusted to parents, as opposed to other
interested parties, should be increased.' Though not always explained in
these terms, a number of educational innovations being implemented or consid-
ered around the nation promote one or both of these reforms. Indeed, the extant
innovation that attracts the most lavish praise from Chubb and Moe turns out,
upon examination, to be a mechanism for enhancing voice, not choice.
1. Reducing Exit
Chubb and Moe have it backwards. The trick is not to increase exit but to
reduce it. Let me begin my illustrative list of suggestions near where Chubb
and Moe leave off-with open-enrollment programs.
Most of the exit options that siphon off educational connoisseurs from
urban public schools are suburban, not private, school options."9 Connois-
seurs prefer to keep as much of the existing public subsidy as they can, while
still congregating in higher quality schools. One means of discouraging such
escape-long familiar to interdistrict school desegregation advocates-is to
186. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
187. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
188. The second reform helps foster the first. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at 37 ("If customers
are sufficiently convinced that voice will be effective, then they may well postpone exit."). Using both
reforms, the public schools can be made to emulate the salutary choice-denying, voice-inspiring qualities
of the Catholic system without having to be subsumed-unconstitutionally-in that system. See supra notes
96-102, 178-82 and accompanying text.
189. The percentage of private school enrollment dropped from 1960 (13.9%) to 1975 (10.0%), but
has climbed since (to 12.7% in 1990). See Peterson, supra note 80, at 53, 71 & tbl. 2.12.
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break down school district lines. If parents know, to paraphrase Joe Louis, that
they can run but they can't hide, at some point they may stand and fight for
better schools. Properly administered open-enrollment plans can accomplish this
goal if they encompass entire multiethnic, multiclass districts (as in the Massa-
chusetts plans discussed above), metropolitan areas (as in the desegregation
plans in metropolitan Kansas City, Milwaukee, and St. Louis), and states (as
in the Minnesota and Nebraska plans). 19° By voluntarily distributing urban
poor and minority children among all the schools in a given area, those plans
effectively distribute the educationally motivated families now concentrated in
the suburbs among the wider range of urban magnet and suburban schools to
which city kids gain access.
Once poor and minority children freely can breach district lines, and
wealthier children no longer can escape behind them, the next logical step may
be to abolish the boundaries altogether. Abolition may occur either by consoli-
dating large metropolitan areas into single districts (as in the Wilmington
desegregation plan)191 or, by removing control from local districts and effec-
tively turning states into single districts (as a former education official in the
Reagan Administration recently proposed).192
Increasing the proportion of state, as opposed to local, financing for
schools, as Kentucky, Texas, and Wisconsin recently have done, 193 also can
make escape to the suburbs more costly, by diverting a greater share of the tax
revenues collected there to city districts and forcing suburbanites to pay even
higher taxes than before to maintain their schools' quality differential. Munici-
pal payroll taxes then can be used to increase the incentive of suburban commu-
ters to move back to the city to take better advantage of the services their
payroll taxes buy, while rising suburban taxes make it harder for urban employ-
ers to flee the payroll tax.
As suburban schools become less insular, private schools presumedly will
attract an escalating share of urban exiters. The states easily could stem the
existing private school-bound trickle, and forestall its becoming a tide, by
terminating the myriad subsidies they currently give private and parochial
schools. The Supreme Court decisions upholding the grant of such subsidies
190. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1656; supra note 142 and accompanying text. As discussed, supra
notes 145-50 and accompanying text, open-enrollment plans must be strictly controlled in order to avoid
stratification on the basis of consumer sophistication and information.
191. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1659-60.
192. Chester E. Finn, Reinventing Local Control, EDUC. WK., Jan. 23, 1991, at 40; see also Karen
Diegmueller, RI. Governor Proposes Creating 6 Regional Districts, EDUC. WK., May 22, 1991, at 16
(governor's proposal to reduce number of school districts in Rhode Island from 37 to 6).
193. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUhr.
L. REv. 1, 37 (1990); Edward B. Fiske, Historic Shift Seen in School Finance, N.Y. TINIES, Oct. 4, 1989,
at B9; Lonnie Harp, Hard-Won Finance Measure Faces New Challenge in Texas, EDUC. WK., July 31, 1991,
at 29; Debra Viadero, Wis. Lawmakers Adopt Controversial School-Finance Plan, EDUC. WK., July 31,1991,
at 32 (permitting state income tax credit equal to amount of schools-targeted local property tax paid on first
$30,000 of value of primary residence).
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(as long as the benefit parochial schools derive is "indirect 1 94) provide a
rough catalogue of existing subsidies: States fund private school transporta-
tion,195 lend textbooks to private school students,196 provide remedial pro-
grams to parochial students on public school premises,'9 7 and reimburse pri-
vate schools for the cost of state-imposed examinations.' All of these pro-
grams provide "financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private
schools," which "'make[s] it more likely that some children choose to attend"'
such schools.'99 As the Court has acknowledged, however, "a State could
rationally conclude as a matter of legislative policy that constitutional neutrality
as to sectarian schools might best be achieved by withholding all state assis-
tance."2'
The most important benefit that state and federal governments give to
nonprofit private and parochial schools is exemption from property, sales,
payroll, and other taxes.20' "Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that
affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become 'indirect and vicarious
"donors.' .22 Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, allow governments
to jettison such exemptions without fear of free exercise objection and reveal
a growing interest in doing so on the part of revenue-starved taxing jurisdic-
tions.2 3 As the Court has noted, "[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have
a substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but [is
permissible because it] will not prevent those schools from observing their
religious tenets." 204
194. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,464 n.7 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,674-75
(1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-45 (1968); see supra note 100.
195. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
196. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Allen, 392 U.S. 236.
197. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244-48.
198. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). See generally
Stanley S. Litow, Deputy Chancellor of the New York City Public Schools, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST.
3., Mar. 5, 1991, at A13 (public taxpayers fund "hefty portion of the cost per pupil for Catholic schools
in New York City," including "food, transportation, remedial reading and math programs, and substance-
abuse education").
199. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 464 & n.7 (1973) (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 679 (1971)).
200. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 462; see id. at 469; infra note 246.
201. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29-33 & nn.2-3 (1989) (Scalia, I.,
dissenting) (citing statutes exempting religious organizations from taxation); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 577-79, 581-92 (1983) (describing federal tax exemptions and charitable-deduction
status for religious entities); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (all states exempt at least some
religious property from taxation).
202. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion) (quoting Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591).
203. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688, 696 (1990) (validating
extension to religious organizations of "generally applicable income or property taxies]" and sales taxes
on "religious ... 'training' services"); Hemandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 694-700 (1989); Texas
Monthly, 489 U.S. at 21-25; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-60 (1982).
204. Bob Jones Univ, 461 U.S. at 603-04. Legislators could make terminated tax exemptions do double
exit-deterring duty by giving the additional revenues collected to the public schools, thus increasing the lost
subsidy penalty for exit to private schools.
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According to the collective action literature, even low mean levels of
constituent interest and resources need not impede successful agitation for
change if the constituency includes a "critical mass" of patrons who strongly
desire change and have the means to pursue it.2"5 Although the exit-reduction
proposals discussed here would increase the number of "connoisseurs" in public
school constituencies, the question remains whether there are enough to go
around. Widely distributing all the connoisseurs who currently congregate in
suburban and private schools probably would suffice; distributing only those
connoisseurs who respond to the reforms discussed above might not. Were
those reforms insufficient, a more radical-even incendiary-measure might
deserve attention, namely, making public school attendance compulsory.
Although in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,20 6 decided in 1925, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a seemingly identical idea, Pierce merits reconsider-
ation against the possibility that drastic exit-reduction measures come to be
required.
The Pierce story began with Meyer v. Nebraska,07 which struck down
a World War I-era statute forbidding teachers to conduct public or private
school classes in German. Meyer's holding was a terse application of the
Lochner v. New York 20s principle, long since overruled, that the Due Process
Clause prohibited Nebraska from suspending-although the state could regu-
late-Meyer's economic right to pursue the calling of his choice.209 The case
more recently has come to stand for a curious dictum in which Justice
McReynolds quoted, then cast out of our constitutional realm, Plato's proposal
205. See Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity,
and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. Soc. 522, 529, 543 (1985); cf. Ron,, d J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 863, 879-90 (1991) (because they now comprise critical mass of highly interested constituents,
institutional investors can help overcome collective action problems that keep other investors from
successfully monitoring management).
206. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
207. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
208. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
209. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400. But see Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198
(1979) (Meyer affords no "constitutional right to retain [one's] employment as a teacher"); Day-Brite
Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The
affinity between Lochner, Meyer, and Pierce is no accident. As Professor Woodhouse is documenting,
William Guthrie, the constitutional scholar and lawyer who designed the litigation strategy that led from
Meyer to Pierce, also laid the intellectual groundwork for the Lochner Court's constitutionalization of
classical economics, see WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1898), and argued many of the watershed cases of the
Lochner period, including Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), McCray v. United States, 195 U.S.
27 (1904), Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20
(1922). See Barbara B. Woodhouse, William Dameron Guthrie: The Case of the New York Conservative
and the Birth of Fundamental Family Liberties, in NEW YORK AND THE UNION 637, 638-39, 643-50
(Stephen L. Schechter & Richard B. Bernstein eds., 1990) (sketch of longer work in progress, which author
has graciously shared with me). As Professor Woodhouse shows, the same libertarian notions about the evil
of public welfare programs and about a man's rightful control of his property-including, in this view, his
children (gender specificity intended)-motivated Guthrie's arguments and the Court's decisions in both
the Lochner-era economic due process cases and in Meyer and Pierce. See id. at 644-49, 652-53.
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that the Republic remove children from their parents at birth and raise them
itself.210 Even if interpreted as establishing a "right of the individual to...
bring up children," '' Meyer is limited by additional dicta recognizing that
"[tihe American people have always regarded education and the acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance" and "[t]hat the State may do
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally."2"' Accordingly, as long as students were
free at some point to receive formal foreign language lessons, Meyer acknowl-
edged the right of the states to require "all schools... [to] give instruction[]
in English." 213
Two years later, Pierce struck down Oregon's requirement that "every
parent.., of a child between eight and sixteen years ... send him 'to a public
school.' ""4 Again, the Court's holding applied the Lochner principle. Adopt-
ing the private school plaintiffs' unanswered allegations, the Court found that
"[t]he inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act under consideration would
be destruction of appellees' primary schools, and perhaps all other private
primary schools for normal children within the State."2 5 Because Oregon had
undertaken to abolish and not simply to regulate the plaintiffs' schools, the
Court granted their request for "protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and
unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their
business and property."2 6 With this holding extinct, like those of Lochner
and Meyer, Pierce now stands for Justice McReynolds' dictum-that "[t]he
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only."2 7 The Court tempered
this dictum, however, by emphasizing the state's broad power to regulate
schools, including the power to specify the courses that may and may not be
taught and who is qualified to teach.218
On close analysis, the post-Lochner incarnations of Pierce and Meyer may
go no further than the proposition that the state may require children to secure
a state-defined education, in English, but may not "forc[e] them to accept
210. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02.
211. Id. at 399.
212. Id. at 400, 401.
213. Id. at 402. The Meyer law might never have reached the Supreme Court had the Nebraska high
court not replaced an earlier interpretation, allowing formal foreign language instruction as long as every
child also received specified instruction in English, with an interpretation forbidding foreign language
instruction in all formal educational settings. Compare Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v.
McKelvie, 175 N.W. 531,534-35 (Neb. 1919) with Meyer v. Nebraska, 187 N.\V. 100, 103-04 (Neb. 1922),
rev'd, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
214. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
215. Id. at 534. The plaintiffs were the Society of Sisters, which operated numerous Catholic schools
in Oregon, and Hill Military Academy. Id. at 531-33.
216. Id. at 536.
217. Id. at 535.
218. Id. at 534.
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instruction from public teachers [and in English] only."2 19 The decisions thus
may consist with the principle that the state may control part, but may not
occupy the entire field, of each child's education.' ° Put the other way around,
the decisions may mean only that the state must let parents supplement, but
need not let them replace, the state's control over whether, when, and
how-and, if the greater power includes the lesser, where and by
whom-children are educated.
Although the Court often has cited Meyer and Pierce for the principle that
Plato's parent-supplanting Republic is not our own,"' only once, in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,' has the Court actually relied upon those decisions to limit the
state's freedom to regulate education as it chooses. Even in granting the Amish
an exemption from the final two years of Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance laws, however, the Yoder Court took pains to limit its decision and
those in Meyer and Pierce.
The Yoder Court: (1) emphasized the intersection of the Amish parents'
Pierce claim with a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, carefully confining
the decision to the right of parents "to guide the religious future and education
of their children' and vowing to reject any objection "to reasonable state
regulation of education if [the objection] is based on purely secular consider-
ations";' (2) emphasized that the Amish parents' faith interposed an absolute
conscientious objection to, and "not merely a... preference" against, second-
ary education which, if ignored, would imperil "the continued survival of
Amish communities" in the United States;' (3) noted that even these indi-
vidual interests would be overcome by the "compelling" nature of "the State's
... interest in its system of compulsory education," but found less compelling
219. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
220. From the oral argument in Meyer until today, the laws invalidated in that case and in Pierce have
been understood to have "forb[idden] absolutely the maintenance of primary private schools in th[e] State."
Oral Argument of Petitioner at 2, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325) (likening statute before
Court to another Nebraska bill, proposed the same year, which would have outlawed all formal private
education in state); see Woodhouse, supra note 209, at 651 (modern scholar's description of Pierce as
involving "[e]xclusive state control of all organs of education and the closing of all religious schools").
221. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2943 (1990); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 190 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
222. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
223. Id. at 232.
224. Id. at 215 (emphasis added); see id. at 215-16 ("A way of life, however virtuous and admirable,
may not be interposed as a barrier to a reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely
secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief."); id. at 233 (Pierce is "a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their
children" (emphasis added)). Also suggesting the need for a religious free exercise facet to make a Meyer-
Pierce claim viable are: Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601-02 & n.1 (1990); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 & n.29 (1983); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165,
166 (1944).
225. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209; see id. at 218. The Court often has rejected free exercise attacks on state
laws that make religious practices more difficult or costly but do not require adherents to engage in conduct
their faiths forbid. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688, 696-97
(1990); Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
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the State's actual interest in the case in giving Amish children an additional
two years of compulsory education against the "speculative" possibility that
they might someday leave the community and need the two extra years of
schooling; 6 (4) acknowledged the existence of state educational interests that
might not be attainable except through compelled public education; 27 and (5)
emphasized the limited nature of Meyer and Pierce.' Since Yoder, the Court
consistently has "stressed the limited scope of Pierce," which simply forbids
the states to "'pre-empt the educational process by requiring children to attend
public schools"' and "len[ds] 'no support to the contention that parents may
replace state educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of
what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy member of soci-
ety. ' 229
Even in their heyday in the early 1970's, therefore, Meyer and Pierce
continued to bear the admittedly stingy construction offered above-that the
decisions forbid states Platonically to "preempt" control over the education of
minor children but, short of preemption, allow the states to take substantial
portions of that control for themselves. More importantly, the two decisions'
heyday may have passed. In United States v. Leeao in 1982 and Employment
Division v. Smith2 t in 1990, the Court substantially limited Meyer and Pierce
in the process of narrowing the two decisions' only modem application-in
Yoder.
In Lee, the Court denied an Amish farmer a free exercise exemption from
social security taxes. Acknowledging that paying such taxes is as "sinful" to
the Amish2' as letting their children attend the tenth grade 233 and that the
government's interest in its social security system is no greater than a state's
interest in its public school system,'-4 the Court narrowed Yoder considerably
226. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224; see id. at 221,222,228-29,231-34; see also id. at 213 ("Providing public
schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State."). The Court often has subordinated the Meyer-
Pierce principle to substantial state interests. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603-04 (state interest
in discouraging racial discrimination in college admissions); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976)
(state interest in preventing racial discrimination in private elementary and secondary school admissions);
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462, 470 (1973) (state interest in withholding financial support from
racially discriminatory schools); Prince, 321 U.S. at 168 (state interest in regulating child labor and limiting
exposure of children to "influences of the street").
227. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (state has legitimate interest in providing education "necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system," to "preserve
[children's] freedom and independence," and to "prepare[] individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient
participants in society"); id. at 240 (White, J., concurring) (state has legitimate interest in "provi[ding chil-
dren] ... with an option other than the life they have led in the past").
228. See id. at 232-34; id. at 239 (White, J., concurring). But cf. id. at 213 (majority opinion) (Pierce
recognizes "right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system").
229. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 177 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis
added)); see Norwood, 413 U.S. at 462.
230. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
231. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
232. Lee, 455 U.S. at 255.
233. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209, 218.
234. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-59.
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in the process of distinguishing it. The state, the Court held, only needs to grant
an exemption when, as in Yoder, it can do so without threatening the system
because so few citizens want or can claim the exemption. On the other hand,
the state need not grant an exemption when, as in Lee, it cannot do so without
granting "myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious be-
liefs." 35 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens went further. Noting
that, with the "principal exception" of Yoder, the Court's free exercise jurispru-
dence permits any "valid and neutral law of general applicability" even though
it "proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that [a believer's] religion prescribes (or
proscribes)," Justice Stevens argued that Yoder was aberrational and suggested
that it could not survive the ruling in Lee. 6
In Smith, a majority of the Court made Justice Stevens' free exercise
interpretation its own. Rejecting Smith's claim that Oregon could not penalize
sacramental peyote use, and also rejecting any "compelling state interest" or
other balancing test, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause allows
"application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action." 7 Acknowledging the tension between its rule and Pierce and Yoder,
the Court limited those decisions to situations in which a conjunction of
parental rights-to free exercise and to bring up their children-overcomes the
state interest in applying neutral regulations to all citizens.2s
Given Lochner's demise, Yoder's decline, and Smith's demarcation of free
exercise law, the current meaning of Meyer and Pierce is obscure. Working
backwards chronologically, however, the following readings are possible: Under
Smith's interpretation of Yoder, any "neutral, generally applicable" prescription
of public school or proscription of private school is constitutional except in the
"hybrid situation" of a conscientious objector whose parental-control desires
and religious beliefs are simultaneously offended. 39 Even in that situation,
or even should the Court release Pierce from its post-Yoder confinement to
"religious education" and reinvigorate a "compelling state interest" test, Lee
suggests that a neutral prescription of public school or proscription of private
school would serve a compelling state interest if parental exemption requests
threaten the viability of the public school system. 4 Finally, Meyer and Pierce
(including as construed in Yoder) seem to leave the states free to prescribe
235. Id. at 259-60.
236. Id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
237. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601.
238. Id. at 1601-02 & n.1. It is conceivable that the "conjunction" language in Smith is a screen, and
that the Court now understands Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder as purely parental rights decisions. That under-
standing, however, would: (1) place Yoder on a collision course with the compulsory education laws and
home-schooling restrictions of 50 states, (2) elevate penumbral parental rights to a higher status than textual
free exercise rights, and (3) illogically mix a libertarian approach to parental rights with Smith's majoritarian
approach to free exercise.
239. Id. at 1600-01. Only religious objections, and not mere religious preferences, suffice. See supra
note 225 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 224, 226-27, 234-35 and accompanying text.
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public education as long as the states do not-either directly (as in Meyer) or
in "inevitable practical result"'" (as in Pierce)---" 'preempt' or proscribe all
reasonable times, places, and manners of supplementary private education.u2
Interpreted in this manner, Pierce would not stand in the way of compulso-
ry public school attendance laws that, unlike the one struck down in Pierce,
contain three explanatory and limiting provisions: (1) factually supported
legislative findings that a system of public education is a social necessity that
(like the social security system in Lee) cannot function effectively if more than
a few citizens can exit; 3 (2) "release time" and cocurricular provisions, such
as those that the Court twice has upheld against Establishment Clause attack,
giving students the time and even, if they elect, the "open forum" place in
which to engage in religious and other supplementary educational activities of
their choosing;' and (3) a "conscientious objector" clause that permits
unwilling parents or students to avoid participating in the system upon a
showing of bona fide religious beliefs that forbid their participation. u5
By curtailing exit from public schools except by the few citizens whose
religious beliefs require them to exit organized society, the states could stem
enough connoisseur escape to promote genuine voice-activated educational
reform and simultaneously extend a civic education to all young people whose
coming participation in the larger society requires it.2 Moreover, by assuring
241. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
242. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 239 (White, 3.,
concurring)). On the Court's "reasonable time, place, and manner" jurisprudence in the free speech area,
see, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1196-300 (11th ed. 1985).
243. See supra notes 80-81, 167-82, 227, 234-35 and accompanying text.
244. See Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-73 (1990) (upholding
constitutionality of Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1984), which requires schools with broad
cocurricular programs to permit religious clubs to utilize school facilities on same basis as other clubs);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308 n.1 (1952) (upholding program allowing public school children to
absent themselves from school for "religious observance and education outside the school grounds"); cf.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (public school may not include part-time religious
instruction as part of the school program, even if participation is voluntary and instruction is conducted
by nonschool personnel). To discourage parents from essentially writing off the compulsory public school
portion of their children's education and focusing their attention and resources exclusively on private
supplemental activities, the states could make public school attendance mandatory during a sizable part of
the day and week, use other means to persuade colleges to base admissions on students' performance in
the regular school program, and attract supplemental programs into the public schools.
245. See Johnson v. Prince William County Bd., 404 S.E.2d 209, 210, 214 (Va. 1991) (upholding
school board's denial of request for exemption from compulsory attendance law under statutory provision
that excuses children from school attendance upon showing that, "by reason of bona fide religious training
or belief, [the parent or child] is conscientiously opposed to attendance at school"); cf. Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 441 (1971) (defining military service exemption for individuals "'who, by reason of
religious training and belief, [are] conscientiously opposed to participation in war"' (quoting 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 456(j) (Supp. V 1964))); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (similar); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) (similar).
246. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. This analysis responds to Professor McConnell's
argument that the Free Exercise Clause is violated when the states selectively impose a lost subsidy penalty
on children who attend religious, instead of public, schools. See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective
Funding Problem: Abortion and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L REV. 989, 1015-23 (1991). Only parents
and children who voluntarily or involuntarily serve the compelling public cause of maintaining a viable (i.e.,
nearly all-inclusive, thus voice-suffused) system of public schools deserve to be paid for their service. Just
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all parents reasonably commodious times, places, and manners in which to
supplement their children's education as they please, the states could avoid the
wholesale denial of private instructional opportunities that lay at the heart of
Meyer and Pierce. As incendiary as requiring public school attendance might
seem, this combination of public obligation and constrained, but still significant,
private choice arguably conforms to the proper role of education in a liberal
democratic state 7 and the proper role of virtuous political participation in
a liberal democratic republic.34
2. Concentrating Voice
Why should suburban and private school parents stand for exit-reduction
programs that make them share, pay more for, or even give up their beloved
schools? Although the legislatively adopted open-enrollment programs in
Minnesota and Nebraska and the loophole-closing taxation policies that the
Supreme Court recently has upheld suggest that some suburban and private
school parents might abide the lesser changes, 9 those parents surely will not
abide the greater ones. The latter changes will come, if at all, only when a
coalition of urban and rural parents, teachers, and administrators, suburban
school patrons and educators feeling the pinch from private school competition,
business interests dependent on the public schools for their labor force, disestab-
lishmentarians, and good-government types can defeat the smaller but politically
more formidable coalition made up of the remaining suburbanites, private
school consumers, and the Catholic and evangelical churches. 0 Happily, the
second necessary component of effective voice proposals-a promise of sub-
stantially enhanced parental control over the public schools-may expand the
former coalition and contract the latter one.
Simply by bringing more educationally oriented and vocal parents into the
public schools, exit-reduction programs may increase the ratio of parent to
outsider (e.g., union, bureaucrat, taxpayer) voice. Likewise, increased heteroge-
neity of interest and resource levels within a school's constituency may help
surmount collective-action barriers by more clearly designating the constituents
to whom the leading role must fall and by avoiding the paralysis that can occur
as military conscientious objectors have no claim to the wages and benefits paid volunteer and drafted
soldiers when the objectors engage in alternative service, parents and children conscientiously compelled
to withdraw from public educational "service" have no right to compensation for the alternative educational
activities in which they engage in the private sphere.
247. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 155-63 (1982); Amy Gutmann,
Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338, 349-51 (1980);
Liebman, supra note 42, at 1637-40.
248. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 118, 308 (1984); Liebman, supra note 42, at
1548-65; Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting
Rights, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 443, 445-52 (1989).
249. See also Mark Walsh, Upper-Class Parents Support Diversity, Quality of Public Schools, Study
Finds, EDUC. WK., Mar. 13, 1991, at 15.
250. See Peterson, supra note 80, at 71-73.
[Vol. 101: 259
Voice, Not Choice
when each constituent believes that her neighbor has more to gain than she
from agitating for change 51 Additional concentration of parents' political
power over the schools is necessary, however, to make sure that parents' voices
count. Legislators and educators currently are experimenting with three parent-
centered programs that illustrate the capacity of public policy to enlarge the
proportion of political control given parents.251
The first set of programs undertakes a variety of efforts to enhance parents'
involvement in the day-to-day progress of their children's educationmss 3
Obviously, the more opportunities parents have to interact with principals,
teachers, and each other, the more likely they are to voice their concerns.
Likewise, the more parents participate in their children's learning, the more
informed their suggestions and complaints will be.
A second set of policies capable of concentrating parents' voices and
diluting those of their competitors aims to decrease the size of schools and
school districts.254 Parents at smaller schools have fewer peers by whom they
can be drowned out. In addition, as the communitarian literature makes clear,
voice-inspiring trust and collegiality are easier to achieve in smaller than in
larger polities.255 Most important, a proliferation of smaller districts and
schools can impose diseconomies of scale on outsiders---e.g., politicians, central
office bureaucrats, textbook publishers, and union officials-who compete with
parents to have their policy-steering voices heard. 6
251. Individuals with great interest in a particular public service and substantial resources have
incentives to congregate with like individuals. Doing so may deflate the cost of obtaining (only) the desired
service and make it possible for individuals to take turns agitating for improvement, rather than having to
take the lead every time. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. By contrast, interdependent groups
profit from heterogeneous interest and resource levels. Heterogeneity not only permits "exploitation of the
great by the small," but also forces highly interested constituents, lacking equally interested neighbors whose
"turn" it ought to be to act, to lead the way, and permits strategic sequencing of action ("the least interested
first" when returns diminish as more people act; "the most interested first" when returns increase as more
people act). MANCUR OLsON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 29 (1971); Oliver et al., supra note 205,
at 529, 535-38, 542-48. Indeed, the latter two attributes of heterogeneous collectives suggest that recon-
figuring two groups, one homogeneously interested and wealthy and the other homogeneously apathetic
and poor, into two heterogeneous groups may coax successful collective action from each of the new groups
more often than from either of the old ones-and almost certainly will coax more collective success from
the two new groups combined than from the two old ones combined. See id.
252. Confining the franchise in school board, levy, and bond elections to parents might seem ideal in
this regard, but neither taxpayers nor the Constitution would tolerate such a change. See Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (state may not limit voters in school district elections to parents and
property owners); Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1299-303 (Ill. 1990) (discussed
infra note 258). But cf. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (state may restrict voters electing directors of
water districts to landowners).
253. See p. 164; see also Selected Reading on Parental Involvement in Education, EDUC. WK., Apr.
4, 1990, at 24; William Snider, Parents as Partners, EDUC. WK., Nov. 21, 1990, at 11-20.
254. See, e.g., Debra Viadero, Governor in WiT. Proposes a Limit on Districts' Size, EDUC. WK., Feb.
20, 1991, at 1.
255. See generally Liebman, supra note 42, at 1554-56 (discussing sources).
256. Smaller schools and districts need not be an occasion for easier exit and escape, if the proliferating
boundaries remain porous insofar as student assignment is concerned. See supra note 190 and accompanying
text.
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Inducing public participation, increasing the number and heterogeneity of
constituents desiring reform and their links to the institutions needing reform,
and creating smaller polities may facilitate collective action. But a more
distinguished mechanism for doing so, one that makes the concept of school-as-
polity more than a metaphor, also may be available: (school-level) representa-
tive democracy. Using a variety of "school-based management" and "shared
decisionmaking" techniques, school districts from Miami to Seattle are experi-
menting with plans that devolve the power to set educational policy from the
state and district to the school level, and from administrators alone to elected
committees of parents and teachers2 57 The most radical proposal, recently
adopted by the Illinois Legislature, places the governance of every Chiczgo
public school in the hands of a Local School Council composed of six parents
elected mainly by parents, two community residents elected by community
residents, two teachers elected by the school's staff, and the principal. After
completing an intensive training program, council members appoint principals
to four-year performance contracts, develop and approve school operating plans,
and design and oversee schools' budgets.s
Although proponents of shared decisionmaking offer numerous justifica-
tions, the analysis here suggests two of primary importance, one procedural and
the other substantive. Procedurally, shared decisionmaking adopts the classic
strategy of giving governing authority to representatives of the most highly
interested constituents as a means of overcoming collective action prob-
lems."sa This strategy has the capacity to enhance voice by anointing constitu-
ents whose "turn" it is to lead the way to reform and by formalizing lines of
communication through which parents can convey their views.
257. See pp. 199, 305 nn.17-20; Liebman, supra note 61, at 393-97 & nn.150, 165 (citing authority);
Betty Malen et al., What Do We Know About School-Based Management? A Case Study of the Literature--A
Call for Research, in 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 289-342; William Cells, More Schools
Being Run by Local Panels, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at A14; see also HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at
17 (decentralization may make "the channels of communication between members and management in the
public school systems less 'cumbrous' than heretofore"); David K. Cohen, Governance and Instruction:
The Promise of Decentralization and Choice, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 337, 363-66
(decentralization unlikely to work unless new political structures are created to foster parent and community
participation).
258. See Moore, supra note 146, at 172-73, 193-95 (critical goal is to transfer "majority control" to
"parents and community residents"). Compare Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1299-
303 (Il. 1990) (provisions in original Chicago law giving parents disproportionate representation on local
boards and letting only parents vote for parent board members held to violate Equal Protection Clause) with
Peter Schmidt, Illinois Legislature Revises Chicago School-Reform Law, EDUC. WK., July 31, 1991, at 12
(describing Illinois Legislature's attempt, in response to Fumarolo, to enhance parents' political power
without offending "one person, one vote" principle by giving all voters five votes to cast for six parent
members and two community members on schools' 1-member councils). As is true of the well-known
Miami plan and the District 4 plan discussed below, the Chicago plan combines school-based control devices
that concentrate voice with open-enrollment devices that help reduce exit and increase voice. See Joseph
A. Fernandez, Dade County Public Schools' BlueprintforRestructured Schools, in 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL,
supra note 36, at 223, 238-45,248-49; Moore, supra note 146, at 176; infra notes 262-64 and accompanying
text.
259. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 205, at 879-81.
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Substantively, shared decisionmaking gives parents more to control, hence
more of consequence about which to vocalize. By giving parents a role in
decisions previously left to the district's or school's central office-decisions
about academic priorities, testing, disciplinary policies, and even
personnel-shared decisionmaking gives parents responsibilities in the urban
public schools that they now officially, or at least implicitly, have only in
suburban and especially private schools. Moreover, by enabling parents from
diverse backgrounds to construct, and in the process to commit themselves to,
a single mission, shared decisionmaking can help solve one of the great dilem-
mas in education: How schools can achieve the focus and sense of mission that
many educators consider the key to school success without giving in to the
class-based, ability-grouped, racially segregated, and religiously parochial
stratification towards which current arrangements and their choice alternatives
gravitate."0 The communitarian and constructive aspects of shared decision-
making help resolve two other dilemmas: How (exit-denying) coercion can lead
to (voice-enhancing) loyalty, and how withdrawing (escape) options can
increase (communally implemented) power.6 1
Notably, the extant school reform program that attracts the most praise from
Chubb and Moe because of its open-enrollment feature is more accurately
called-as by its architects-a shared-decisionmaking plan.262 The plan, which
operates in elementary and middle schools in Community School District 4 in
New York City's East Harlem, combines two important elements. The plan's
open-enrollment feature assures that no school in the district can become a
haven for educational connoisseurs seeking escape or a warehouse for those
left behind. The plan's shared decisionmaking component encourages "[t]each-
ers, parents, and students ... to think of themselves as their schools 'owners'
and to take the responsibilities-and the pride and involvement-that real
ownership entails." 263 If time and study confirm anecdotal evidence that the
260. Noting this dilemma are, e.g., Levin, supra note 36, at 252; Richard M. Merelman, Knowledge,
Educational Organization and Choice, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at 82-85; see also
Liebman, supra note 42, at 1614-35 & n.693 (in concert with shared decisionmaking, school desegregation
can reform racially divided political processes and constituencies by situating blacks and whites so that they
share interests and a fairly organized political context in which to effectuate those interests).
261. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 17, at 78 ("loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice"). Shared
decisionmaking plans also can help solve the problem of excessively bureaucratic teachers' unions. See pp.
11-12, 48-53, 153-55, 286 n.20. Instead of busting teacher organizations, see p. 53, shared decisionmaking
modernizes them by transferring power from centralized bureaucracies on the industrial model to localized
and more managerially involved associations on the contemporary craft model, see, e.g., Ann Bradley, Gov.
Romer Unveils Teachers' Contract for Denver Schools, EDUC. WK., Apr. 3, 1991, at 1 (describing proposed
contract trading centralized union prerogatives for expanded teacher role in decisionmaking at individual
schools); Denver Teachers Have Ratified a Groundbreaking Contract Written by Gov. Roy Romer of
Colorado, EDUC. WK., May 1, 1991, at 3. See generally MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE
SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIvIDE (1984).
262. See Seymour Fliegel, Creative Non-Compliance, in 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 36, at
199, 208; Deborah Meier, Good Schools Are Still Possible, But Teachers Must Be Freed from System
"Mandates," DISSENT, Fall 1987, at 543, 549.
263. Pp. 212-15.
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plan has improved the achievement of the district's predominantly African
American and Latino children, the credit should go not to the ability of parents
to escape, but to a design that forces parents to stay put while empowering
them vociferously to fight.1 4
These voice-enhancing practices suggest that the authors have it wrong
when they equate democracy with bureaucracy and condemn both as the polar
opposites of choice. 65 More accurately, as Max Weber had it decades ago,
bureaucracy is a kind of midpoint between voice-based democratic control and
exit-based market discipline.266 It is not surprising, therefore, that bureaucracy
took hold in public education when easy escape by vocal citizens rendered
democracy unworkable at the same time as socially necessary restrictions on
exit rendered market discipline ineffectual. Analyzed this way, bureaucratic
control over the schools is not so much an unmitigated evil as the best solution
nominally democratic governments can muster when the polity's vocal citizens
stop complaining and leave.
More important, as the authors' District 4 and suburban examples establish,
and as private school board elections and governance procedures also reveal,
properly voice-activated democracy is quite capable of eluding bureaucracy and
coexisting with effectively organized schools.2 67 The authors thus miss their
own message: Bureaucratic "behavior is not something that Americans simply
have to accept, like death and taxes. People who make decisions about educa-
tion would behave differently if their institutions were different." 8 As shared
decisionmaking exemplifies, however, the way to needed institutional reform
264. See pp. 212, 214; Fliegel, supra note 262, at 206-08. James Corner's well-regarded work in New
Haven also has as a main purpose the enhancement of parental participation and voice via the construction
of family-school alliances. See James P. Comer, Educating Poor Minority Children, Sci. AM., Nov. 1988,
at 42-48. As do all democratic constitutions, the "constitution" of the school-based polities contemplated
here may have to forbid procedures that are antidemocratic in the long run, even if they are supported by
a majority in the short run. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1536-37 n.343, 1557-71. Thus, just as a wider
polity's constitution might forbid certain kinds of separate but equal segregation and other denials of
simultaneous participation and equal protection, the school-based polity's "constitution" may have to forbid
tracking and other devices that stratify the political community and, as a result, frustrate voice. See id.; supra
notes 140, 162.
265. In the authors' view, "the most fundamental causes" of school failure in the United States are
"the institutions of direct democratic control." P. 2. In their view, interest group politics "inexorably"
determine who takes office in a democracy, and bureaucracy "inevitably" describes how democratic
officeholders govern. Pp. 17, 21-34, 39-45, 66, 141, 167, 188. The authors acknowledge that there are
different "kinds of democratic institutions," and that "different systems of institutional control" produce
"different types of schools." Pp. 2, 19-20, 26-27. Despite that acknowledgement, the authors deny that
democracy could ever be disengaged from either interest group politics or bureaucracy and that new
democratic forms could ever improve schools. See, e.g., pp. 31, 38.
266. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (A. M. Henderson &
Talcott Parsons trans., 1947); see NONET, supra note 125, at 25-26, 42-57.
267. See supra notes 65-69, 262-64 and accompanying text; see also Cohen, supra note 257, at 337,
363, 366 (noting that "[a]ffluent neighborhoods with many resident professionals (mostly suburban), have
been the special locale of a reform oriented, 'non-partisan' and universalistic politics of educational quality"
and wondering if "new neighborhood political movements or elites... [can] be constructed" that could
"invent a new politics" for urban public schools).
268. P. 189.
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is to make those institutions more-and not, as the authors would make them,
less-democratic.
CONCLUSION
Parents' wealth, students' ability, and the motivations of both will continue
to determine why one family's Johnny can't read and another family's Jane
does just fine. The pressing question facing educational policymakers is how
the wealth, ability, and academically oriented motivations of those who are
better off in these respects can be mobilized on behalf of those who are less
well off. Choice plans are not the answer. They are a recipe for disaster.
However designed, choice plans inevitably will turn the schools into new and
more efficient machines for sorting educational consumers into numerous
homogenized pools of parents and children with the same levels of wealth,
intellectual ability, consumer sophistication, academic orientation, and ethnicity.
That, after all, is what markets are good for.
One thing markets are not good for is allocating public goods, and an
educated public is just that.2 9 Accordingly, exit and choice will never work
well to allocate that good-unless working well means warehousing the poor,
the less gifted, and the academically disinclined in educational facilities that
make existing public schools look like the Institute for Advanced Studies, and
that prepare young adults for no place in the social structure save the correc-
tional facilities they would resemble.
Voice plans, by contrast, may be an answer. By stemming or shutting off
exit from the public schools, voice plans encourage the most committed con-
sumers of educational services to bring their recuperative complaints and
counsel to bear upon the schools whence they now seek only to escape. By
devolving power to the school level, voice plans construct polities that are small
and dispersed enough to give the actors most concerned with educational
quality-students, parents, teachers, and principals-an advantage over compet-
ing constituencies for whom decentralization creates serious diseconomies of
scale. In this way voice plans compensate parents for lost exit opportunities
and, for the first time since the baby boom went bust, concentrate power in the
hands of persons who are able, and have no attractive option but, to stand and
fight for better schools. Most important, by creating new and more collegial,
even communitarian, political structures for exercising family-school control
at the local level, voice plans create the possibility of a new politics. Such a
politics might achieve something like the unity of purpose that choice propo-
nents valorize in the homogenized schools at the high-end of their market, but
do so more inclusively and appealingly by harmonizing the voices of diverse
communities into a single chorus of demands for educational improvement.
269. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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At the very least, before destroying what not so long ago was the nation's
liberal, democratic, and egalitarian treasure-its system of common public
schools-shouldn't we give (real) voice a chance?
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